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This A1iicle examines the role that Title IX has played in the debate over 
college athlete compensation, including the litigation that seeks to 
challenge the National Collegiate Athletic Association's longstanding 
policies that prohibit members from compensating athletes or sharing with 
them the revenue produced by the licensing of their names and likenesses. 1 
Title IX, a federal statute passed in 1972, prohibits sex discrimination in 
educational institutions that receive federal funds. 2 In Title IX's early days, 
the NCAA was not a great fan of the law. In fact, the association backed 
political and litigation eff01is in the 1970s and 80s aimed at foreclosing the 
statute's application to athletics.3 Today, however, as the NCAA faces 
public criticism and legal action over its policies that prohibit 
compensation for college athletes, it has taken to using Title IX as a 
defensive shield. In response to the argument that withholding 
compensation from athletes whose labor generates millions of dollars of 
revenue is tantamount to exploitation, the NCAA argues that paying 
athletes in revenue sports, coupled with the commensurate obligation under 
Title IX to pay female athletes, would be prohibitively expensive for 
college athletics as we know it.4 Ergo, no pay for play. 
1. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass'n., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-
121359 (Reg. 13 Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document 
.aspx/09031d4581667b6f; O'Bam1on v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2012). 
3. RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE 
ATHLETICS REFORM 147 (2011); Sara A. Elliott & Daniel S. Mason, Gender Equity in 
Intercollegiate Athletics: An Alternative Model to Achieving Title IX Compliance, 11 J. 
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 1, 11 (2001). 
4. See, e.g., NCAA's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and Likeness 
Licensing Litigation, No. 09-CV-1967-CW, 2013 WL 6818041, at *22-24 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 12, 2013) (arguing that amateurism policy helps ensure member institutions' 
financial ability to offer women's sports and less prominent men's sports); Declaration 
ofJames E. Delany in Support of the NCAA'S Class Certification Opposition Brief, In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litigation, No. 09-CV-1967-
CW, 2013 WL 1100330, at '1[10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2013) (Big Ten Commissioner 
argues that pay-for-play would "seriously undermine the objectives of Title IX and 
reduce other athletic opportunities for students, regardless of gender."); see also 
Editorial Board, Pay for Play and Title IX, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2014, 
http://www .nytimes. com/20 14/03/23/ opinion/ sunday /pay-for -play-and-title-
ix.html?_t=O; Kevin Trahan, Why the NCAA's Title IX Excuse No Longer Works, SB 
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This position has made Title IX the enemy of those who support the 
reform of college athletics to eliminate the exploitation of college athlete 
labor. 5 If Title IX does not require schools that pay male athletes in 
revenue sports to also pay female athletes in nonrevenue sports, then the 
NCAA cannot sustain its positioning of Title IX as an obstacle to athlete 
compensation. The debate about what Title IX would or would not require 
is therefore operating as a proxy for whether college athletics should or 
should not reform in a way that addresses the exploitation of 
uncompensated labor. 
This Aliicle seeks to advance two positions. First, that the NCAA is 
right: In a world where male athletes in revenue sports are paid, Title IX 
would require payment of female athletes using some measure of equality. 
Second, that NCAA's critics are right: athletes are being exploited by the 
present system. But, the refmmers needn't fear the NCAA's use of Title 
IX as a shield. Used properly, Title IX presents the reformers with a 
sword. If, as the NCAA has suggested, Title IX implications render the 
application of labor and antitrust law to college athletics prohibitively 
expensive, the NCAA's only choice will be to refmm college athletics to 
restore the primacy of educational over commercial values, or alternatively, 
to separate the commercial interests from higher education entirely. Either 
approach would simultaneously address concerns about the exploitation of 
uncompensated labor, gender equity, and cost containment. For this 
reason, it is important that college athletics confront the Title IX 
implications of decisions that result in compensation for athletes. 
This Article will proceed in three patis. First, it will describe the 
controversy over athlete compensation, including the NCAA's. amateurism 
position over time and the challenges to that position that have been 
mounted in courts of public opinion as well as in the courts of law. One 
such case is that of Northwestern University's football players, who won a 
momentous decision in the spring of 2014, when a regional-level opinion 
of the National Labor Relations Board agreed that they were being treated 
like employees and thus had the right to engage in collective bargaining 
with their institution. Another is the class-action lawsuit lead by former 
UCLA basketball player Ed O'Bannon against the NCAA. This summer, a 
NATION (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2014/4/14/5613112 
/ncaa-title-9-ed-obannon; Mechelle Voepel, Title IX a Pay-for-Play Roadblock, ESPN 
(July 15, 2011 ), http;//espn.go.com/college-sports/stmy/_/id/6769337 /title-ix-seen-
substantial-roadblock-pay-play-college-athletics. 
5. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, When It Comes to Paying College Athletes Title IX 
Is More of a Red Herring than a Pink Elephant, FORBES (Feb. 4, 2014), 
http://www .forbes .com/sites/marcedelman/20 14/02/04/when-it -comes-to-paying-
college-athletes-is-title-ix-more-of-a-red-hening-than-a-pink-elephant/; Ellen J. 
Staurowsky, ''A Radical Proposal": Title IX Has No Place in College Sport Pay-For-
Play Discussions, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 575 (2012). 
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federal district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the NCAA violated 
federal antitmst law by prohibiting institutions from allowing athletes to 
share in the revenue institutions derive from licensing their athletes' names 
and likenesses. 
Second, this Article will examine the consequences for college athletics 
under Title IX should athletes prevail in any of the litigation challenging 
their exploitation in revenue sports. It concludes that college athletic 
departments would have a legal obligation under Title IX to provide 
commensurate compensation for female athletes. Though such an outcome 
conflicts with principles of capitalism, which would othetwise operate to 
limit compensation to those athletes whose labor has value on the open 
market, it is nevertheless the right result. That is because an institution's 
obligation to pay female athletes arises from application of a civil rights 
law, which in the context of Title IX and other such laws, reflects 
democratic consensus of the priority equality over the freedom of private 
entities to make unconstrained market choices in such fundamental 
contexts as education. 
In its third Part, this Atiicle will reframe the application of Title IX to 
athlete compensation as a tool, rather than an obstacle, to achieving college 
athletics reform. It takes the NCAA at its word that complying with a 
requirement under North-western or 0 'Bannon to allow some degree of 
athlete compensation, in combination with Title IX, is prohibitively 
expensive, at least for most institutions. This reality could therefore 
motivate college athletics to reform its way out of having to comply with 
labor and antitmst law by curtailing the ways in which college athletics has 
become overly commercialized, since such refonn would operate to 
neutralize the application ofboth decisions. Alternatively, college athletics 
departments could reform themselves by abandoning their connection to 
education and the subsidy that comes with it. Purely commercialized 
programs would embrace the obligation to comply with antitmst and labor 
law, but would insulate themselves from Title IX. By helping to push 
hybrid programs into the paradigm of one or the other, educational or 
commercial, the Title IX implications of Northwestern and 0 'Bannon can 
help to leverage meaningful athletics reform that minimizes athlete 
exploitation, promotes gender equity, and contains cost. 
I. THE CONTROVERSY OVER COLLEGE ATHLETE AMATEURISM 
Intercollegiate athletics began in August 1852, when the rowing teams 
from Harvard and Yale met at Lake Winnipesauke, New Hampshire, for an 
exhibition race. 6 This athletic contest did not occur because students were 
passionate about rowing and eager to test their skills against like-minded 
6. SMITH, supra no!e 3, at 1. 
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competitors. It was not the brainchild of university officials seeking to 
foster school spirit through friendly athletic rivalry. Nor was it suggested 
by the faculty seeking to enhance students' character education by 
immersion in such concepts as discipline and endurance. Rather, the first 
intercollegiate athletic competition was a commercial proposition. It was 
sponsored by the Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad as a way to 
promote travel and tourism to the New Hampshire lakes' region. The 
nascent railroad paid for the competitors' vacations in exchange for the 
athletes' participation in the exhibition race before a thousand spectators.? 
Notably, the origin of intercollegiate athletes occurred under pretenses 
that are prohibited today. The NCAA, the association of colleges and 
universities that regulates intercollegiate athletics, promotes the view that 
students who participate in intercollegiate athletics embody the ideals of 
amateurism. They play for the love of the game, not for perks or 
compensation. It uses the phrase "student-athlete" to drive home the 
distinction between college players and their professional counterparts,8 
and its slogan describes them as mostly "going pro in something other than 
sport."9 Unlike their early predecessors, today's "student-athletes" are 
prohibited from selling their services to the likes of the BCM Railroad in 
exchange for compensation in the form of free vacations. 10 
The NCAA's position on amateurism has evolved over the years. It has 
also been controversial long before litigation came to a head this year. 
That history, as well as the present-day controversy-including the 
litigation-is the subject of this Part. 
A. Background on the NCAA's Amateurism Policy 
The NCAA's amateurism policy has been controversial throughout the 
organization's history. At the tum of the last centuty, college and 
7. !d.; STEVEN A. RIESS, SPORTINlNDUSTRIALAMERICA 1850-1920 (2012). 
8. Ellen J. Staurowsky & Allen J. Sack, Reconsidering the Term Student-Athlete 
in Academic Research, 19 J. OF SPORT MANAGEMENT 103, 105 (2005). 
9. Press Release, NCAA Launches Latest Public Sen,ice Announcements, 
Introduces New Student-Focused Website, NCAA (Mar. 13, 2007), 
http:/ /fs .ncaa. org/Docs/PressArchive/2007 I Announcements/NCAA %2BLaunches%2B 
Latest%2BPublic%2BService%2BAnnouncements%2Bintroduces%2BNew%2BStude 
nt-Focused%2BW ebsite.html. 
10. See generally NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12, reprinted in Nat'l Collegiate Athletics 
Ass'n, 2014-2015 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL OCTOBER VERSION [hereinafter NCAA 
MANUAL], at 57, available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4380-2014-2015-
ncaa-division-i-manual-october-version.aspx; NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.1.2(a), reprinted 
in NCAA MANUAL, at 59 (declaring a student-athlete ineligible for competition if he or 
she "uses his skills for any form of pay in that sport," where "pay" is defined to include 
"salary, gratuity, or any fmm of competition); NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.1.2.1.4.3, 
reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, at 60 (limiting what a student-athlete can accept from an 
outside sponsor to include only "actual and necessary expenses."). 
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university leaders created the NCAA under political pressure to standardize 
the rules of football in the hopes of lowering the game's mortality rate. 11 
At the NCAA's first convention in 1906, however, the topic of amateurism 
was also on the table, as some delegates argued for rules that would have 
prohibited athletic departments from accepting any funding other than 
direct support from the college or universityP But instead, the prevailing 
model of amateurism that emerged from that convention focused on 
keeping the students, not the institutions, free of influence and pressure that 
comes from money. Universities and their alumni could not offer 
compensation for a student's athletic services, and students were deemed 
ineligible if they had ever accepted payment for competing in a sporting 
event. 13 
At the same time, however, colleges and universities were realizing that 
athletic programs could generate some revenue and, perhaps of even 
greater value, institutional publicity. 14 These commercial pressures made it 
difficult to resist the temptation to field competitive teams, especially in 
football. And since the NCAA at the time relied on the honor system 
method of compliance, member institutions found it easy to skirt the rules: 
coaches paid athletes from funds designated for "needy students" or found 
fake jobs for them on campus. 15 Alumni contributions subsidized tuition 
and living expenses for players, and financial aid offices subsidized tuition 
for athletes who had no academic interest or ability. 16 A report published 
by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1929 
found that 81 out of 112 colleges studied subsidized athletes' tuition by 
means such as jobs, loans, athletic scholarships, and outright compensation 
and other perks. 17 Such evidence of the failure of NCAA's amateurism 
code has caused some scholars to liken it to Prohibition: similarly difficult 
to enforce, and serving only to drive the targeted conduct underground. 18 
Eventually, institutions didn't even try to keep these practices hidden. 
When conferences began adopting conflicting positions on amateurism, as 
happened, for example, when the Southeastern Conference became first to 
11. W. Burlette Catier, The Age of Innocence: The First 25 Years of The National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, 1906 to 1931, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 211, 215 
(2006). 
12. !d. at 222-23; RANDY R. GRANT ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF INTERCOLLEGIATE 
SPORT 24-25 (2008). The initial bylaws also banned recruiting and participation by 
freshmen. Id. 
13. GRANT, supra note 12, at22-23. 
14. ALLEN L. SACK& ELLEN J. STAUROWKSY, COLLEGE ATHLETES FOR HIRE: THE 
EVOLUTION AND LEGACY OF THE NCAA's AMATEUR MYTH 20 (1998). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 23. 
17. Id. at 36. 
18. Id. 
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openly allow athletic scholarships in 1936, the NCAA was powerless to 
object. 19 
Intolerance for these abuses eventually led the NCAA to undertake a 
massive reform effort in 1948. Later dubbed the "Sanity Code," this 
refmm attempted to recommit the membership to a purer model of athlete 
amateurism in which athletic scholarships, along with other vestiges of 
professionalism, would be prohibited. The Sanity Code also created new 
mechanisms for enforcement that, for the first time, created the possibility 
that violators would be expelled from the NCAA.20 Quickly, however, the 
NCAA caved to the preferences of its more powerful members, and in 1950 
changed course on the issue of athletic scholarships. That year, the NCAA 
membership voted to allow them so long as they were administered by the 
institution's financial aid office rather than the athletics department.21 Still, 
even after they were permitted, some colleges and universities declined to 
offer athletic scholarships. The Ivy League voted in 1954 to prohibit 
athletic scholarships and enforce other measures designed to ensure 
athletics remained secondary to academic mission of its member 
institutions.22 Other schools that shunned scholarships out of commitment 
to an educational model of athletics eventually became Division III when 
the NCAA adopted its three-division structure in 1973.23 
Meanwhile, athletes and others began taking the view that athletic 
scholarships operated as compensation and rendered athletes employees of 
the college or university-in particular, for purposes of workers' 
compensation law.24 In 1963, a Califomia court mled that a Cal Poly 
football player killed in a plane crash retuming from a game in 1960 was 
an employee for purposes of Califomia's workers compem;ation law.25 
This mling, which allowed the players' family to recover financial 
compensation for his death, "sent shock waves through the NCAA. "26 
Leadership counseled member institutions "to avoid the impression that 
athletes had to participate in sports in order to retain their athletic 
scholarships."27 The NCAA coined the phrase "student-athlete" to distance 
collegiate athletes from their professional counterparts, and advised its 
members to include disclaimers stating scholarships did not constitute 




SMITH, supra note 3, at 85, 89; GRANT, supra note 12, at 31. 
GRANT, supra note 12, at 31. 
I d. at 32. 
22. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 49. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 80-81. 
25. Van Horn v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 219 Cal. App. 2d 457, 460 (1963). 
26. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 81. 
27. Id. at 82. 
28. ld. at 83; see also WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT: EXPLOITING 
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prevailed in the next wave of workers compensation decisions. The 
Indiana Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that a player paralyzed during 
basketball practice could not recover under workers compensation law as 
an employee of Indiana State because he did not consider the scholarship to 
be compensation, as evidenced by his failure to report it on his tax 
returns.29 That same year, the Michigan Comt of Appeals held that an 
injured student-athlete was nevertheless not an employee under workers 
compensation law. 30 Though the court considered an athletic scholarship to 
be compensation,31 that factor was outweighed by other findings that 
weighed against the athlete's employee status, such as the lack of the 
university's control over the athlete and the status of football as a non-
integral aspect of the university's business.32 Remarkably, these victories 
came notwithstanding changes to the NCAA bylaws-one (1967) allowing 
universities to cancel scholarships during the award period for misconduct 
and insubordinate and another (1973) that prohibited multi-year 
scholarships33 -that had rendered the continuation and renewal of athletic 
scholarships to be conditioned on performance, a hallmark of employment-
based compensation. 
B. The NCAA's Amateurism Policy Today 
The NCAA's present policy on amateurism permits member institutions 
in Division I and II to offer scholarships tied to a student's participation in 
athletics. Bylaws limit athletics grant-in-aid to the cost of tuition, room 
and board, and books.34 They also prohibit member institutions from 
offering any additional payments beyond grant-in-aid that would in any 
way compensate students for their athletic participation,35 and prohibit 
athletes themselves from accepting such compensation from third pmties.36 
COLLEGE ATHLETES 72 (1995) (on the coining of "student-athlete."). 
29. Rensing v. Ind. State Univ. Bd. ofTrs., 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983). 
30. Coleman v. Western Mich. Univ., 336 N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). 
31. I d. at 226. 
32. Id. at 226-27. The court also found it relevant that the university could not 
cancel the scholarship based on performance, though this was not true. SACK & 
STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 87-88. 
33. GRANT, supra note 12, at 35; SACK& STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 83-84. 
34. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 15.02.5, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 10, at 
189. For athletes who are otherwise eligible for other institutional financial aid (i.e., 
that is not based on athletics), the bylaws cap their awards at the cost of attendance. 
NCAA BYLAWS, ati. 15.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 10, at 190. 
35. Otherwise, the only other payment an athlete may receive from his or her 
institution is going-rate compensation for services actually rendered in the context of a 
work-study job. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12. 1.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 
10, at 59; NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.4.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 10, at 
67. 
36. The bylaws prohibit student-athletes from accepting direct or indirect 
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The restriction on compensation from third-patiies operates to prevent 
athletes from licensing their names, images, and likeness, to those, like 
broadcasters, video game producers, and merchandise manufacturers, who 
would otherwise pay the athlete for that right. Relatedly, as a condition for 
eligibility, athletes sign a form that authorizes the NCAA and third parties 
acting on its behalf to use their names and likeness to promote the 
association's events. 37 The form apparently operates to relinquish athletes' 
rights in perpetuity to the commercial use of their names, images, and 
likenesses, including after they graduate. 38 
While athletes themselves are restricted to amatem status, there is 
nothing amateur about the big time collegiate athletic programs for which 
they play. Institutions that compete in the NCAA's Division !-
particularly, the Football Bowl Subdivision-invest millions of dollars in 
facilities, operating and recmiting costs, and coaches' salaries,39 and they 
expect a positive return, whether that be from the distribution of bowl game 
television contracts, NCAA basketball toumament proceeds, season ticket 
sales, or other somces.40 Motivated by business objectives rather than 
educational ones, college athletic departments drive the competitive market 
for well-compensated head coaches (who are sometimes the highest paid 
public employee in their state) and spend lavishly on amenities and 
facilities designed to attract the top recmits.41 Some institutions do manage 
to profit handsomely on the investments they make in their football and 
men's basketball programs.42 However, it is these profits that open up big-
compensation or gifts in any way connected to their participation as college athletes, 
including sponsorships in excess of "actual and necessary expenses" to participate in 
non-collegiate competitions. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.1 .2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, 
supra note 10, at 59. 
37. NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.5.1.1, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 10, at 
68; NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.5.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 10, at 71; 
NCAA Form 08-3a. 
38. O'Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C-09-1967-CW, C-09-3329-CW, C-09-4882-CW, 
2010 WL 445190 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
39. In the Football Bowl Subdivision, institutions' median expenditures on 
athletics in fiscal year 2013 was $62,227,000, while the highest reported was 
$146,808,000. NCAA REVENUES & EXPENSES DIVISION I REPORT 24, tbl. 3.1 (2014), 
available at 
http://www .ncaapublications. com/productdownloads/D 1 REVEXP20 13. pdf. Football 
programs are the most expensive; the median expenditure for football programs was 
$15,279,000 and the highest reported was $41,550,000. !d. at 25, tbl. 3.4. 
40. See id. at 30, tbl. 3.7 (breaking down revenue by source). 
41. See id. at 32-33, tbl. 3.9 (providing a breakdown of expenses by type); 
KNIGHT COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, COLLEGE SPORTS 101: A 
PRIMER ON MONEY, ATHLETICS, AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 11-12, 
16-17 (2009), available at http:/ /www.knightcommission.org/images/pdfs/cs 10 l.pdf 
(describing arms race in expenditures for facilities and coaches' salaries). 
42. The reported median figure for revenue generated by Division I FBS athletics 
programs was $41,897,000 in 2013; the highest reported was $165,691,000. NCAA 
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time athletic programs to the criticism that they are exploiting the free labor 
of athletes who make those profits possible.43 
Defenders of amateurism refute arguments that athletes are exploited by 
pointing out that athletes often receive scholarship assistance to attend 
college.44 They argue that some athletes receive federal Pell Grants (need-
based financial aid) in addition to their athletic scholarships, which may 
exceed the cost of attendance of for some athletes. 45 Yet, proponents of 
athlete compensation argue that for many athletes, scholarship and other 
support is insufficient to cover the hue cost of attending college.46 
Moreover, the time commitment required of athletes in these big-time 
programs precludes many of them from holding down the kind of pmi-time 
job that other college students have to make ends meet. In addition, it is 
not always clear that athletes receive a meaningful education in exchange 
for their athletic participation. Athletes are routinely clustered into easy and 
potentially useless majors, denied opportunities for academic enrichment 
such as internships, and assigned to "tutors" complicit in academic fraud. 47 
REVENUES & EXPENSES DIVISION I REPORT, supra note 39, at 22, tbl. 3.1. Football 
programs were the most lucrative. The median reported figure for football revenue was 
$20,278,000 and the highest was $109,400,000. Id. at 25, tbl. 3.4. 
In terms of net revenue, only 20 of the 123 institutions in Division I FBS reported a 
profitable athletic department, a median figure of $8,449,000. Id. at 28, tbl. 3.5. The 
other 103 reported losses with median figure of $14,904,000. Id. Looking at football 
programs, 69 reported net eamings from their football programs, with a median 
reported figure of $12,926,000. Id. at 27, tbl. 3.6. The other 54 institutions lost money 
on football with a median reported figure of $3,818,000. I d. 
43. E.g., Marc Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why 
A Win for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litigation Will Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1032 
(2014) ("Thus, at a time when the NCAA executives, college presidents, athletic 
directors, and coaches have all become exceedingly wealthy, many student-athletes 
remain poor."); Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCmmick, The Myth of the 
Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 75-77 
(2006); Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www. theatlantic. com/magazine/archive/20 11/1 0/the-shame-of-college-
spmis/30864 3/?single _page=tme. 
44. E.g., Darren Rovell, NCAA holds firm: No pay for play, ESPN (Dec. 11, 
2013 ), http:/ /espn.go.com/college-sports/story/ _jid/1 01197 50/ncaa-president -mark-
emmett-insists-pay-play-model-coming. 
45. See, e.g., Ron Morris, No Need to Pay College Athletes, THE STATE, (Jan. 25, 
2014) (atiicle no longer available online); Jon Solomon, Pelf Grants for Players: 
Division I Athletes in Alabama got $4.8 Million in need-based aid, AL.COM (Apr. 10, 
2014), 
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/20 14/04/pell_grants _for _players_ divisi.html. 
46. See Christopher Davis, Jr. & Dylan Oliver Malagrino, The Myth of the "Full 
Ride": Cheating Our Collegiate Athletes and the Need for Additional NCAA 
Scholarship-Limit Reform, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 605 (2013). 
47. Ramogi Huma & Ellen J. Staurowsky, The $6 Billion Heist: Robbing College 
Athletes Under the Guise of Amateurism, NAT'L COLL. PLAYERS Ass'N (2012), 
available at http://www.ncpanow.org/news/articles/body/6-Billion-Heist-
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Many athletes fail to graduate. 48 These arguments take on a race and class 
dimension as well, since the NCAA's amateurism policy is particularly 
harmful to athletes who are recruited out of poverty and who, owing to 
systemic discrimination, have lacked access to educational resources prior 
to attending college.49 
Despite increasing public criticism,50 the NCAA has been unwilling to 
undertake significant reform as a voluntmy matter.51 Its policies continue 
Study_Full.pdf; Sarah Ganim, CNN Analysis: Some college athletes play like adults, 
read like fifth-graders, CNN (Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/0l/07/us/ncaa-
athletes-reading-scores/. 
48. Report: Football Players Graduate at Rates Lmver Than Non-Athletes, INSIDE 
HIGHER ED (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2013/09/27/ 
report-football-players-graduate-rates-lower-non-athletes#sthash.NB4NxgwW.t9xFbs 
Bn.dpbs; see also BILLY HAWKINS, THE NEW PLANTATION: BLACK ATHLETES, 
COLLEGE SPORTS, AND PREDOMINANTLY WHITE NCAA INSTITUTIONS 18 (2010) 
(questioning whether universities' multi-million dollar investments in academic 
support centers are actually investments in "academic evasion centers."); id. at 71-73 
(discussing exploitation through miseducation, including the clustering of black 
athletes in watered-down majors that aim not to educate athletes but simply to keep 
them eligible under the NCAA's academic standards). 
49. Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, Race and Interest 
Convergence in NCAA Sports, 2 WAKE FOREST J. L & POL'Y 17, 24-25 (2012) ("In this 
way, the NCAA amateurism regime-in which free market principles determine 
compensation for coaches and all other economic beneficiaries of college sports, but 
not for athletes-replicates the apa1iheid-like systems that have existed throughout 
histmy and under which members of the racial majority have exploited the labor of 
minorities for entertainment and profit."); see also Erin Buzuvis, Title IX Feminism, 
Social Justice, and NCAA Reform, 5 FREEDOM CENTER J. 101, 112-114 (2014); 
Branch, supra note 43 (ascribing to the NCAA's amateurism rules, "an unmistakable 
whiff of a plantation"); HAWKINS, supra note 48, at 14-15. 
50. See, e.g., Doug Bandow, End College Sports Indentured Servitude: Pay 
"Student Athletes", FoRBES, Feb. 21,2012, available at http://www.cato.org/publicatio 
ns/commentary/end-college-spmis-indentured-servitude-pay-student-athletes; Branch, 
supra note 43; Frank Deford, Bust the Amateurism Myth, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 
(Dec. 11, 2011), http://chronicle.com/article/NCAA-Frank-Deford/130058/; Boyce 
Watkins, Is the NCAA Racist or Just Getting Rich? BLACK VOICES (Aug. 4, 2009) 
(a1iicle no longer available online); Michael Wilbon, College athletes desen'e to be 
paid, ESPN (July 18, 2011), http:/lespn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/6778847/ 
college-athletes-deserve-paid; see also Staurowsky, supra note 5, at 578-80 (noting 
and documenting public attention to the pay-for-play debate). While noting the recent 
flurry of commentary calling for student athlete compensation, it is important to note 
that scholars and commentators have been calling for such reform for many years. 
Rodney K. Smith, An Academic Game Plan for Reforming Big-Time Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 67 DENV. U. L. REv. 213, 225-227 (1990) (presenting arguments for 
rejecting continued adherence to amateurism value in college athletics); see also Seth 
Davis, Should College Athletes Be Paid? Why They Already Are, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, 
(Sept. 21, 2011 ), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2011/09/21/branch-rebuttal (citing 
commentator's criticism of amateurism from 1905). 
51. To be sure, there have been some examples and attempts at reform. In 2011, 
the NCAA briefly allowed Division I members to offer a $2000 cost of living stipend 
to athletes on full scholarship, to better reflect the true cost of attendance. NCAA 
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to hold athletes to an amateur ideal, yet permit member institutions to run 
athletic departments as commercial enterprises that put revenue generation 
ahead of athletes' personal and academic welfare. 
C. Legal Challenges to NCAA Amateurism Policy 
In light of the NCAA's reluctance to change its position on athletes' 
amateur status, present and former student athletes are seeking to leverage 
the law in ways that would compel the NCAA to abandon the status quo in 
favor of some manner of freedom for athletes to capitalize on their market 
value. Both labor law and antitrust law have been the subject of such 
efforts, as described below. 
1. Labor Law Challenge: Are College Athletes "Employees" 
Under the NLRA? 
In January 2014, present and former college athletes created the College 
Athletes Players Association, a labor organization seeking to advocate for 
the rights and safety of college athletes through the means of collective 
bargaining. Though CAP A is a new organization, it is an outgrowth of a 
well-established advocacy organization, the National College Player 
Association, which was founded in 2001 and is lead by former UCLA 
football player, now activist, Ramogi Huma.52 Additionally, CAPA is 
receiving financial support from the United Steelworkers, the largest labor 
union in the United States. 53 
Soon after creating CAPA, Huma and Kain Colter, a quarterback from 
Northwestern University (since graduated), petitioned the National Labor 
Relations Board for the right to hold an election to authorize CAP A as the 
representative of Northwestern University football players in collective 
bargaining with the university.54 CAP A's expressed objective is to 
negotiate on players' behalves for health insurance that would cover 
medical expenses for injuries sustained during competition.55 The petition, 
members voted to rescind the plan, with many citing concerns that stipends were 
prohibitively expensive to administer in a gender equitable manner. NCAA Shelves 
$2000 Athlete Stipend, ESPN (Dec. 16, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/7357868/ncaa-puts-2000-stipend-ath1etes-hold. 
52. See Who We Are, COLL. ATHLETES PLAYERS Ass'N, 
http://www.collegeathletespa.org/about (last visited Mar. 13, 2015); About NCPA, 
NAT'L COLLEGE PLAYERS Ass'N, http://www.ncpanow.org/about (last visited Feb. 4, 
2015). 
53. See What We're Doing, COLL. ATHLETES PLAYERS ASS'N, 
http://www.collegeathletespa.org/what (last visited Feb. 04, 2015). 
54. Tom Farrey, Kain Colter Starts Union Movement, ESPN (Jan. 28, 2104), 
http:/ /espn.go.com/ espn/ otll story 1_/id/ 103 634 30/ outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-
football-players-trying-join-labor -union. 
55. CAP A's website, for example, lists "[g]uaranteed coverage for sports-related 
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filed with the Board's regional office in Chicago, was accompanied by a 
stack of union authorization cards signed by Colter's teammates.56 
Northwestern, the petitioners' putative employer, challenged the petition, 
arguing that college football players are not employees within the meaning 
of the National Labor Relations Act, and thus do not have rights under the 
statute to engage in collective bargaining. 57 In February of 2014, the Board 
held a hearing at which players and coaches provided testimony on the 
question of whether the athletes constitute employees under the law. 58 
In March, the Board's Regional Director concluded that the 
Northwestern players were statutory employees and granted their petition 
for a representation election59 (that election has since taken place, though 
the result remains impounded pending the outcome of Northwestern's 
appeal to the full NLRB). In reaching this conclusion, the Director focused 
his analysis on the common law definition of employee, which courts have 
recognized as being incorporated into the NLRA. Under this definition, an 
employee is a person who performs services for another while subject to 
the other's control, and in retum for payment.60 The Director thus 
organized his analysis around the fundamental elements of compensation 
for services and control. 
As to compensation for services, the Director found evidence of a quid 
pro quo exchange between the football players' labor and the scholarships 
they receive. Scholarships, of course, have economic value-which the 
Director found to exceed $76,000 per year taking into account tuition, fees, 
medical expenses for cunent and former players" first on its list of goals. See What 
We're Doing, COLL. ATHLETES PLAYERS Ass'N, http://www.collegeathletespa.org/what 
(last visited Feb. 04, 2015). 
56. The law requires union authorization cards from 30% of members of the 
proposed bargaining unit, so presumably the petition was accompanied by at least 26 
petitions (30% of 85). Gregg E. Clifton & Shawn N. Butte, College Athletes: Students 
or Employees?, COLLEGE & PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LAW, (Feb. 8, 2014), 
http://www.collegeandprosportslaw.com/collegiate-sports/college-athletes-students-or-
employees/. 
57. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2014) ("Employees shall have the right to self-organization, 
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ... "). 
58. Kain Colter Testifies at NLRB Hearing, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http:/ I espn. go. com/ chicago/ college-football/story/jid/1 04 7 6031/northwestem-q b-kain-
colter-testifies-bid-form-college-athlete-union. · 
59. Northwestern Univ. & Coil. Athlete Players Ass'n, N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-
121359 (Reg. 13 Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document 
.aspx/09031 d4581667b6f. 
60. See N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Electric, 516 U.S. 85, 94 (1995); Brown 
Univ. & Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 
UA W AFL-CIO, 342 N.L.R.B. 483, 490 n.27 (2004). 
310 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 41, No.2 
room, board and books.61 Northwestern requires its players to sign a tender 
agreement, which to the Director's mind operated as an employment 
contract because it details the conditions under which the player would not 
continue to receive his scholarship,62 such as engaging in misconduct or 
violating an eligibility requirement imposed by the NCAA.63 Scholarships 
can also be canceled if the player decides to withdraw from the team or fail 
to satisfy obligations to attend practices and games. These conditions 
convinced the Director that scholarships amounted to compensation m 
exchange for perf01mance. 64 
The Director next described how scholarship football players at 
N01ihwestern were subject to the university's control in ways that 
distinguished them from other students. Most obviously, such control takes 
the form of intense demands on the players' time. Pre-season and in-
season itineraries established that players were required to commit as much 
as 60 hours per week to team-related duties.65 Control also takes the form 
of discipline, which coaches impose on players who violate team rules. 
Many of these rules restrict players' private lives that other students do not 
face, including rules that require a coach's pe1mission to make living 
arrangements, apply for outside employment, drive their own cars, travel 
off campus, post items on the Internet, speak to the media, use alcohol and 
drugs, or engage in gambling.66 Finally, the university exhibited control 
over the players' academic engagements, by mandating study hours and 
tutoring and requiring their participation in a professional development 
program. The fact that players may benefit from these requirements does 
not detract from the fact that, as mandat01y conditions for staying on the 
team-and thus remaining eligible for scholarship-they demonstrate high 
and unique levels of control. 
The Director made one additional conclusion regarding the petitioners' 
employment status, which was to distinguish them from the graduate 
student assistants who the NLRB determined in 2004 were not statut01y 
employees, even though they received financial assistance to attend the 
university in exchange for teaching and research services.67 In the case of 
the graduate student assistants, both the services they performed and the 
61. Northwestern Univ. & Coll. Athlete Players Ass'n, N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-
121359 (Reg. 13 Mar. 26, 2013), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document 
.aspx/09031d4581667b6f. 
62. Id. 
63. !d. at 4. 
64. Id. at 15. 
65. Id. The Director cited players' testimony establishing a time commitment of 
40 to 50 hours in season and 50 to 60 hours during pre-season. !d. 
66. Id. 
67. Northwestern Univ., No. 13-RC-121359 at 18 (citing Brown Univ., 342 
N.L.R.B. 483 (2004)). 
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compensation they received were related to the academic purpose of the 
institution, such that the overall relationship between the graduate students 
and the university was "primarily and educational one"68 rather than an 
employment one. In contrast, Northwestem football players are not 
"primarily" students; the services they provide to the university for as much 
as 60 hours a week are not academic in nature, being neither credit-bearing 
nor supervised by the university faculty. 69 
While the Regional Director's analysis may have suppmied his 
conclusion that the Northwestem football players were employees under 
the NLRA, the Director's conclusion is hardly the final word. As of this 
writing, Nmihwestem is appealing the decision to the full National Labor 
Relations Board in Washington, D.C., which typically applies a de novo 
standard of review rather defening to the findings of lower-level agency 
decision makers. It is expected that the outcome either way will thereafter 
be appealed to federal court. 
If the Northwestem plaintiffs prevail on appeal and the Director's 
decision is upheld by the full NLRB and the federal courts, the direct 
impact will be that scholarship football players at Northwestem University 
may elect to be represented by CAP A and engage in collective bargaining 
with the university.70 But practically speaking, the ramifications will be 
even more widespread, as a victmy for the Northwestem plaintiffs will 
inspire athletes at other institutions to similarly petition for the right to 
unionize. These petitioners would prevail as long the programs they 
represent are factually similar to that of Notihwestem in the degree to 
which players are compensated and subject to their university's control. 
Public institutions are not covered by the NLRA, so the NLRB cannot 
authorize collective bargaining there. However, the precedent of its 
Nmihwestem decision could influence the comis who interpret state labor 
laws that do govem public sector unions. Additionally, given that public 
and private schools compete against each other on the field and in the 
market for athletic talent, public institutions would likely feel pressure to 
match whatever benefits the private sector unions successfully bargain for. 
CAP A has stated that the benefit it is seeking to obtain through 
68. !d. 
69. !d. at 18-20. 
70. These petitions would also force the NLRB to sort of questions pertaining to 
the scope of the appropriate bargaining unit, which are as-yet unaddressed. It also 
appears that the Director's decision may have renewed focus on the question of 
whether athletes are employees under other laws as well. For example, a class-&ction 
lawsuit filed in October of 2014 alleges that the NCAA and its Division I member 
institutions are violating the Fair Labor Standards Act in failing to pay athletes the 
federal minimum wage. Steve Berkowitz, New Lawsuit Targets NCAA and Every 
Division I School, USA TODAY, Oct. 23, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/stmy/sports/ 
college/20 14/1 0/23/ncaa-class-action-lawsuit-obannon-case/1779084 7/. 
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collective bargaining is comprehensive health insurance for its members, so 
that players injured during their college participation will not have to 
endure out-of-pocket expenses after they graduate. 71 CAPA also advocates 
for multi-year scholarships which, while already the nmm at Northwestern, 
are not necessarily standard at other institutions despite being permitted by 
NCAA mles. CAPA could even seek to bargain for benefits presently 
prohibited by the NCAA's amateurism mles, since the NLRA contains no 
exemption for an employer's refusal to bargain on the grounds of 
restrictions on the employer resulting from their voluntmy membership in 
an association such as the NCAA. To this end, CAPA could attempt to 
bargain for cost of living stipends, an educational trust fund to help players 
who graduate on time defray the cost of education, or even (though CAPA 
has not publically suppmied for this) market-driven compensation, i.e., 
salary. 72 If demand for CAP A-represented players is strong enough, CAP A 
could leverage its collective bargaining power to pressure the NCAA to 
change the rules to allow its member institutions to meet the union's 
demands. It is also possible that CAPA might find the newly-autonomous 
Power Five conferences willing to implement many of their demands 
regardless of whether the union is able to exert collective bargaining 
pressure. 73 
2. Antitmst Challenges: Are NCAA Bans on Player Competition 
Unlawful Restraints on Trade? 
In 2009, former UCLA basketball star Ed O'Bannon filed a lawsuit 
against the NCAA on behalf of a class of former athletes whose names, 
images, and likenesses appeared in television broadcasts and in video 
games to the financial benefit of their universities as well as the NCAA.74 
The lawsuit challenged various NCAA policies that prohibit athletes from 
receiving compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses. 
These included policies that limit what universities can provide to athletes 
71. Jeremy Fowler, Players as Employees? High Cost of College Football Unions 
Is in Millions, CBS SPORTS (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/ 
eye-on-college-football/24 5 34813/players-as-employees-high-costs-of-co llege-
football-union-is-in-millions. 
72. Id. 
73. Steve Eder, How New N.C.A.A. Rules Will Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2014, 
http:/ /www.nytimes. com/20 14/08/08/sports/ncaafootball/how-new-ncaa-mles-will-
work-or-not.html? t=O (predicting that the Power Five conferences will improve 
medical coverage and offer more robust and multi-year scholarships). 
74. Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O'Bannon v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College Athlete Rights and 
a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319 (2014). For more 
details generally on the procedural history of the O'Bannon lawsuit, see generally id. at 
Part I. 
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as part of their athletic grant-in-aid, as well as those that required athletes 
to relinquish "in perpetuity" the right to license for commercial purposes 
the use of their names, images and likenesses as associated with their 
participation in college athletics. 75 The plaintiffs argue that these 
restrictions on athletes' compensation amount to an unreasonable restraint 
on trade that, as such, violates the Shetman Antitmst Act. 76 
O'Bannon's case77 was assigned to Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. 
District Court for the Northern District of California, who eventually78 held 
a bench trial in June of 2014. Her ruling of August 8 concluded that the 
NCAA's denial of players' rights to capitalize on their own names, images 
and likenesses violated antitrust law. In reaching this conclusion, Judge 
Wilken employed the established burden-shifting approach for 
unreasonable restraint cases. 79 First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant's conduct amounts to a significant restraint on trade in a 
particular market. When a plaintiff satisfies that burden, the defendant 
must then prove that the restraint is justified by a pro-competitive purpose. 
If the defendant succeeds, the plaintiff can still prevail by establishing that 
the defendant could accomplish that purpose by employing a means that are 
less restrictive. 
75. NCAA Form 08-3a; NCAA BYLAWS, art. 12.5.1.1, reprinted in NCAA 
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 68; O'Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C09-1967 CW, C09-3329 
CW, C09-4882 CW, 2010 WL 445190 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
76. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2014) ("Evety contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."). 
77. O'Bannon's case was consolidated with other similar cases, which resulted in 
the addition a second group of plaintiffs that used a different themy of liability, namely 
violation of their right of publicity, to challenge the NCAA and other defendants' 
licensing practices. However, the NCAA settled with the right of publicity plaintiffs in 
June of 2014. Other original and later-added defendants, namely, Electronic Arts and 
the Collegiate Licensing Corporation have also settled all claims. Michael McCann, 
NCAA Reaches Settlement ~with Keller Plaintiffi: What Does It Mean? SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (JUNE 9, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-footba!V2014/06/09/ncaa-
keller-lawsuit-settlement. 
78. In the run-up to the trial, the judge denied the NCAA's motions to dismiss and 
for summary judgment. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2014 WL 1410451, at *17-18 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014) (as 
well as other various pre-trial motions). 
79. Antitrust plaintiffs have two avenues for satisfying the unreasonableness 
requirement. Some types of agreements, like price fixing agreements among 
competitors, are deemed "per se" unreasonable, and thus automatically constitute 
illegal restraints on trade. For other agreements not governed by the "per se" rule, the 
courts will use a "rule of reason" test, which asks whether the restraints' hann to 
competition is outweighed by procompetitive effects. Judge Wilken ruled that the 
plaintiffs in this litigation will have to satisfy the rule of reason, because the per se rule 
does not apply to agreements between and among the NCAA, CLC, and licensees, who 
were not horizontal competitors engaging in price fixing. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
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In O'Bannon, the plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden by proving that 
the NCAA's suppression of athletes' and former athletes' rights to license 
their own names, images and likenesses restrains trade in two discrete 
markets: the market for college education and the market for group 
licenses. The judge agreed that, absent the NCAA's restraint, top recruits 
in football and men's basketball could bargain with colleges and 
universities to receive some form of compensation derived from the 
licensing of their names, images and likenesses. The restraint, therefore, 
operates as a price-fixing agreement among those (colleges and 
universities) who are in the market to "purchase" the athletic talent of 
students who are recruited to play.80 Additionally, Judge Wilken found, the 
NCAA's ban on athlete compensation ensures that colleges and the 
conferences they belong to can enter into licensing agreements with 
television broadcasters and other users of athletes' names, images and 
likenesses (namely, video game producers) without having to compete 
with the athletes themselves. If the NCAA did not restrict the athletes from 
doing so, they would otherwise be in a position to collectively (via a group 
license) undercut the license fees that individual universities and 
conferences charge to broadcast or otherwise use the athletes' names, 
images and likenesses. 
Having concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied their initial burden, the 
court then considered the NCAA's various arguments that the challenged 
restraints serve some procompetitive purpose,81 ultimately concluding that 
two of the NCAA's proposed justifications satisfied the defendant's burden 
at this stage of the inquiry. The NCAA argued that foreclosing athletes' 
compensation for their names, images, and likenesses is justified by the 
need to maintain the NCAA's tradition of amateurism, which in tum, 
ensures that the NCAA's product is distinct from that offered by 
professional spmis. While there was no evidence to suggest that a 
80. As Judge Wilken points out, an agreement among buyers to only buy at a 
certain price (a monopsony) is just as much price-fixing as an agreement among sellers 
to only sell at a certain price (a monopoly). O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 993. It is also 
possible to look at colleges and universities as those in the business of selling the 
college-athletic experience. In this light, the restraint on players' rights to capitalize on 
their names, images, and likenesses is built into the price of selling that experience, and 
thus may be seen as monopolistic price-fixing as well. Id. 
81. The NCAA had offered an additional argument that was dismissed prior to 
trial for lacking a sufficient evidentiary basis to survive summaty judgment. In Re 
NCAA Student-Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litigation, C 09-1967 CW, 2014 
WL 1410451, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11 2014). Specifically, the judge rejected that the 
restraints on athletes' compensation are necessary to ensure that athletic programs can 
provide adequate suppoti non-revenue sports, including women's sports. There was no 
evidence, she reasoned, to suggest why the NCAA couldn't lift the restraint but still 
implement rules that would ensure those sports are protected. For example, the NCAA 
could require member institutions to distribute some portion to licensing revenue to 
non-revenue sports. Id. 
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"sweeping prohibition" on such compensation was necessary to ensure a 
market for amateur athletics, the court agreed that some upper limit on 
athlete compensation was justified by this rationale.82 
The court also agreed that restricting athletes' compensation to some 
degree was justified by the NCAA's goal of ensuring that college athletes 
are integrated into their academic communities. Though the court rejected 
that this goal justified the blanket restriction on athletes' compensation for 
the use of their names, images, and likenesses-indeed, some 
compensation could provide some students with the means to focus more of 
their attention on academics-the couti agreed that some limits on athletes' 
compensation could be justified by the wedge that money would drive 
between athletes and other students. 83 
The court rejected others of the NCAA's procompetitive arguments, 
however. The court concluded that the NCAA failed to prove that its 
desire for competitive balance among teams justifies its restraints on athlete 
compensation. The NCAA did not provide any evidence that restricting 
athletes' compensation actually promotes competitive balance, and even if 
it did, the court acknowledged that any such effect would be neutralized by 
the lavish spending that some athletic programs spend on facilities, 
amenities, and the salaries of their coaches. 84 Along similar lines, the court 
rejected the idea that foreclosing athlete compensation was necessmy to 
increase "outputs"-i.e., teams, and thus, games-by attracting more 
schools to join the NCAA and by lowering the financial burden of doing 
so. The couti found no credible evidence that colleges and universities 
were attracted to the NCAA because of its ban on athlete compensation, or 
that changing the rules would have significant impact on its membership.85 
Since restraining athletes' compensation serves, at least in part, to ensure 
a market for distinctly amateur athletics and to promote athletes' academic 
integration, the court considered the NCAA's burden to be satisfied and 
looked to the plaintiffs to prove that a less restrictive approach could as 
effectively serve the same goals. The court agreed with two of the 
plaintiffs' proposed altematives to the blanket restriction on athlete 
compensation: first, the NCAA could allow colleges and universities to use 
licensing revenue to provide athletes with stipends that would make up any 
difference between the true cost of attendance and the grants-in-aid to 
tuition, room and board, and books.86 Because the stipends athletes would 
receive in this model could be used for school supplies and educational 
expenses, this less-restrictive altemative would still ensure amateurism and 
82. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 999. 
83. Id. at 1003. 
84. Id. at 1002. 
85. Id. at 1004. 
86. Id. at 1005. 
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promote academic integration. 87 
Second, the court agreed that the NCAA as an alternative could allow 
colleges and universities to divert some of the proceeds they receive from 
licensing athletes' names, images, and likenesses to a tmst from which 
athletes would be compensated once they are no longer emolled.88 The 
court found that such a policy would not hurt consumer demand for the 
NCAA's product so long as the payments were limited in amount (the court 
endorsed $5000 as an upper limit to this amount, based on the absence of 
evidence that payments that low would harm the market for college 
athletics89) and dish·ibuted by equal shares to all members of the team.90 
Delaying payment until after their time in college would ensure that 
payments did not impair the athletes' education by separating them from 
the rest of the student body.91 
As the court concluded that both of these less-resh·ictive alternatives 
support the NCAA's procompetitive justifications for restricting athletes' 
compensation, the court issued a two-part injunction against the NCAA that 
will require the association to modify its amateurism policy. The 
injunction first prevents the NCAA from enforcing any mles that would 
"prohibit its member schools and conferences from offering their FBS 
football and Division I [men's] basketball recmits a limited share of the 
revenues generated from the use of their names, images, and likenesses, in 
addition to a full grant-in-aid."92 However, the injunction expressly 
permits the NCAA to cap such payments at tme cost of attendance as 
defined by the NCAA. Secondly, the injunction prohibits the NCAA from 
enforcing any mles that would "prevent its member schools and 
conferences from offering to deposit a limited share of licensing revenue in 
trust for their FBS football and Division I [men's] basketball recmits, 
payable when they leave school or their eligibility expires."93 This aspect 
of the injunction petmits the NCAA to cap the amount of money that may 
87. I d. at 983. 
88. Id. at 1005-06. 
89. The court also noted the testimony of the NCAA's own witness that he 
"would not be troubled" by payments of $5000, as well as that of Stanford athletic 
director that concern for set in at compensation levels of "six figures." Id. at 983. The 
court also acknowledged the findings of the NCAA's expert who conducted a survey 
on attitudes regarding college sports. 38% of the survey's respondents would be less 
likely to watch or attend college football and basketball games if athletes were paid 
$20,000 or more, and 47% would be less likely to watch or attend games if athletes 
were paid more than $50,000. Id. at 975-76. From this, the expert concluded that the 
smaller the degree of athlete compensation, the less of an effect it would have on the 
popularity of college sports. Id. at 983. 
90. Id. at 983. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 1008. 
93. Id. 
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be held in trust, though that cap may not be less than five thousand dollars 
"for every year that the student-athlete remains academically eligible to 
compete."94 The NCAA has filed its intention to appeal this decision to the 
U.S. Comi of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.95 
While the NCAA challenges the district court's ruling on appeal, it must 
simultaneously defend additional antitrust litigation that has since been 
filed to challenge NCAA's ban on athlete compensation beyond the context 
of licensing revenue. Some athletes, including West Virginia University's 
Shawne Alston, have sued the NCAA and the powerful Division I 
conferences SEC, ACC, Big 12, Pac-12 and Big Ten, arguing that 
restraining colleges from compensating athletes for the tlue cost of 
attendance is an unlawful restraint on trade.96 Separately, Clemson's 
Martin Jenkins, through his attomey, antitrust lawyer Jeffrey Kessler,97 
filed an antitrust challenge targeting more generally the NCAA's ban on 
athlete compensation. Alston's and Jenkins's lawsuits, along with others of 
a similar nature, have been consolidated and assigned to Judge Wilkens, the 
same judge that ruled against the NCAA in the O'Bannon case.98 An 
absolute victmy in Jenkins's case would prohibit the NCAA from 
enforcing any limits on compensation that NCAA member institutions can 
offer to their athletes and shift the college recruiting process to a free 
market paradigm.99 It is also possible to imagine various partial victories, 
however, if the judge determines-as she did in 0 'Ban non-that some 
upper limit on athlete compensation is justified by one of the NCAA's 
procompetitive arguments, such as to promote athletes' academic 
integration, to retain a marketable distinction between the NCAA's product 
and professional sports, or to ensure competitive equity among programs. 
While the latter of these arguments was rejected by Judge Wilken in 
0 'Bannon, it is possible that the NCAA could perhaps more persuasively 
defend in the context of a lawsuit aimed at removing all limits on athlete 
compensation, as opposed to just the revenue derived from athletes' names 
94. Id. 
95. NCAA Files Appeal of O'Bannon Ruling, ESPN (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/college-footbalVstmy/ _/id/113 87865/ncaa-fi!es-intent-appeal-
obannon-decision. 
96. Shawne Alston Suing NCAA, Others, ESPN (Mar. 6, 2014), 
http:/ I espn.go. com/ college-football/story/ _lid/ 1 05 5 88 93/ncaa -conferences-sued-
scholarship-value. 
97. Steve Eder, A Legal Titan of Sports Labor Disputes Sets His Sights on the 
NC.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/sports/ 
jeffrey-kessler-envisions-open-market-for-ncaa-college-athletes.html. 
98. Jon Solomon, Judge Draws NCAA Doubleheader with 0 'Bannon, 
Scholarship Cases, CBS SPORTS (June 17, 2014), http://www.cbssports.com/college 
footba!Vwriter/jon-solomon/24590912/judge-draws-ncaa-doubleheader-with-obannon-
scholarship-cases. 
99. See Edelman, supra note 43, at 1054-55. 
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and likenesses. In sum, while the legal ramifications of the district comt 
ruling in 0 'Bannon remain to be seen, the case certainly creates potential 
for a wide range of restrictions on the NCAA's amateurism policy as it 
stands today. 
II. APPLYING TITLE IX TO AMATEURISM REFORM 
As described in the section above, college athletics may soon be 
compelled by law to modify its amateur paradigm. Unless either defendant 
successfully appeals Northwestern or 0 'Bannon, some players will be able 
to capitalize on the market demand for their participation in college 
athletes, whether by sharing somehow in the proceeds of broadcasts and 
other endeavors that use their names, images, and likenesses, or by 
hamessing their collective bargaining power to obtain some form of 
compensation or other benefits above and beyond what the NCAA 
currently permits as pmt of athletics grant-in-aid. This Pmt will identify 
the possible outcomes that could result directly or indirectly from the 
above-mentioned litigation, and analyze the implications for Title IX. 
A. The Right to Engage in Collective Bargaining 
The NLRB's ruling, if upheld on appeal, only applies directly to 
scholarship football players at Northwestem University-and not even all 
Northwestem football players at that. The Director's decision singled out 
for exclusion from his ruling non-scholarship or "walk-on" players, who do 
not receive a scholarship as compensation for services and who are not as 
restricted as scholarship players from engaging in academic pursuits. In 
making the distinction even among players on the same team, the Director 
clearly signaled that not all college athletes are employees under the 
NLRA. Going fmward, therefore, the degree to which the decision could 
be relied upon in support of other athletes' rights to engage in collective 
bargaining100 would depend on the similarity of those athletes' experience 
to those of the N orthwestem football players, on the matters that influenced 
the Director's decision-namely, whether they provide services for 
compensation and are subject to institutional control. 
100. Athletes who persuade the NLRB that they are employees under the NLRA 
could theoretically elect to be represented by CAP A It would be up to the NLRB to 
determine the appropriate bargaining unit for each successful petition, based on the 
community of interests among the unit's members. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2014). Such 
an analysis would consider, among other factors, the degree to which athletes are 
similar in terms of "skills, interests, duties and working conditions." Kindred Nursing 
Ctrs. East, LLC v. N.L.R.B., 727 F.3d 552, 560 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. 
ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 689 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2012)). 
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1. Are female athletes subject to institutional control? 
Female athletes in many big-time programs-in particular, basketball 
programs-could likely convince the NLRB that their lives are controlled 
by athletics to a degree comparable to that of Northwestern's football 
players. 101 To this end, the Board would consider whether a women's 
program is subject to a similar commitment of time and comparable 
regulations of their private lives and their academic pursuits. Some 
research by the NCAA suggests that at least in general, the time 
commitment for Division I women's basketball (37.6 hours per week) is 
similar to that of men's basketball (39.2 hours) and football (43.3 hours). 102 
Female basketball players reported a slightly higher number of missed 
classes per week (2.5) than football players (1. 7), 103 a result that is 
consistent with other independent research shows that male and female 
athletes perceive that athletics interfere with their academic work at 
similarly high rates-78% and 82% respectively. 104 A similar percentage 
of Division I female basketball players (16%) as FBS football players 
(17%) reported taking cetiain classes at the suggestion of their coaches105 
and choosing classes because they fit in with their practice schedule ( 4 7% 
of FBS football players and 45% of Division I women's basketball 
players). 106 Though a contested petition to unionize would likely require 
the female athletes to show in the context of their particular program that 
the degree of institutional control is comparable, and could raise points of 
101. Male athletes in programs other than Northwestern's football program would 
have to make this showing as well. This question would have to be decided on a case-
by-case basis, based on the unique characteristics of each program. Though the 
implications of Northwestern decision on men's nomevenue sports are interesting and 
wmihy of consideration, they are outside the scope of this Article which seeks to 
answer questions about the implications of the decision when viewed in concert with 
Title IX. 
102. DIVISION I RESULTS FROM THE NCAA GOALS STUDY ON THE STUDENT-
ATHLETE EXPERIENCE, NAT'L. COLL. ATHLETIC Ass'N., slide 17 (Nov. 2011), available 
at http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI_ GOALS_FARA _final_1.pdf (PowerPoint 
Presentation)[hereinafter GOALS Study]. Other women's sports repmied a smaller time 
commitment at 33.3 hours per week. Id.; see also Steve Wieburg, NCAA Survey 
Delves Into Practice Time, Coaches' Trust, USA TODAY, Jan. 15, 2011, 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-01-14-ncaa-survey _ N.htm. 
103. GOALS STUDY, supra note 102, at slide 22. 
104. Josephine R. Potuto & James O'Hanlon, National Study of Student-Athletes 
Regarding Their Experiences as College Students, 41 C. STUDENT J. 947, 961 (2007). 
105. GOALS STUDY, supra note 102, at slide 28. Interestingly, men's basketball 
players had a significantly higher response than either women's basketball or football, 
with 27%. Id. These questions also served to differentiate women's basketball fi·om 
the rest of women's sports, as female athletes outside that sport were significantly less 
likely (only 6%) to have been influence by a coach in the selection of their classes. Id. 
106. Id. On this issue, women's basketball players and other female athletes were 
similarly constrained. 
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similarity that go beyond the scope of these data, the NCAA's and other's 
research at least provide the grounds on which to predict that such a 
showing could likely be made by female athletes in many Division I 
basketball programs. 
2. Do female athletes provide services for compensation? 
Next, female athletes petitioning to unionize would have to convince the 
NLRB that they provide services of comparable value to those provided by 
Northwestem's scholarship football players, for which they receive 
compensation. The Director's conclusion that the Northwestem football 
players satisfied this aspect of the statutory definition flowed from three 
findings: (1) athletic scholarships amounted to a "transfer of economic 
value" to the football players receiving them; (2) the existence of a quid-
pro-quo relationship between the scholarship and a football players' 
athletic participation; and (3) that the university derives value from the 
football players' athletic participation.107 Though female athletes are 
similarly situated with respect to the first and second of these reasons-the 
scholarships they receive are of similar value to those awarded to their 
male counterparts and are also conditioned on athletic participation108-
they are, at least in many cases, distinguishable on the third. The Director 
found that Northwestem's football program produced $235 million in 
revenue from 2003 to 2012, a number derived from ticket sales, broadcast 
contracts, and merchandise. 109 He also noted that the team incuned 
expenses of $159 million over that time, resulting in a profit of $76 million 
over nine years. 110 The Director also found that for the academic year 
2012-13, the football program generated net revenue along the lines of $8 
million (when adjusted for the cost to maintain the stadium), and that the 
profit Northwestem generates from football is used to subsidize non-
revenue generating sports. 111 
In context, however, the profitability of Northwestern's football team is 
not a characteristic shared even by most Division I football programs, let 
alone other men's sports and women's sports. For example, according to a 
2013 repoti by the NCAA, 53% of Division I FBS112 football programs and 
107. See supra Part I.C.l. 
108. It is relevant that the Northwestern football players' scholarships provided a 
relatively high degree of "job security" compared to the majority of athletic 
scholarships that are awarded on a year to year basis. Yet the Director still recognized 
them as conditioned on the athletes' participation and compliance with team m1es. 
109. Northwestern Univ. & Coil. Athletes Players Ass'n., N.L.R.B. No. 13-RC-




112. The NCAA report provided separate data for Division I schools whose 
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56% of men's basketball programs generated net revenue while only one 
women's basketball program in this category reported turning a profit. Of 
those profitable programs, the median net revenue for football programs 
was approximately $11.5 million, for men's basketball programs, $3.06 
million, and for women's basketball, $1.3 million. 
Thus, to the extent the NLRB wanted to continue to rely on generated 
net revenue as an indicator of the value of an athletes' labor, it could 
exclude most female athletes (as well as those male athletes who pmiicipate 
in nonrevenue sports) from the statutory definition of employee. To prevail 
on this ground, female athletes would have to argue that the extent to which 
their efforts produce revenue is not a relevant consideration in the analysis 
of whether one is an employee for purposes of the NLRA. To this end, 
they could point out that other NLRB decisions examining the definition of 
employee emphasize wages-for-work, and do not dwell on the question of 
whether and the extent to which their services produce revenue. 113 On the 
other hand, there is NLRB precedent-namely, the Brown University case 
about graduate students-for excluding students from the definition of 
employee on the grounds that their relationship with the university is 
primarily educational. The Board may be more likely to conclude that the 
relationship between a university and a student whose efforts generate 
substantial revenue is not primarily educational and offer this as a 
principled way of distinguishing the status of athletes in non-revenue 
generating sports. 
This factor therefore operates as the bigger roadblock for any efforts by 
female athletes to petition for eligibility to join CAPA or any other union 
for the purposes of collective bargaining. However, explained in the next 
Section, this outcome would not prevent female athletes from nevertheless 
benefiting from the union's collective bargaining. 
B. Title IX's Application to Benefits Obtained Through Collective 
Bargaining 
If the Regional Director's mling certifying the football players' union 
football programs compete in the Bowl Championship Series (the Division I Football 
Bowl Subdivision, formerly Division I-A), those whose football programs compete in 
the NCAA Championship (the Division I Football Champion Subdivision, formerly 
Division I-AA) and those Division I schools without football program. It also reported 
data for Divisions II and III. 
113. WBAI Pacifica Found., 328 N.L.R.B. 1273, 1275 (1999) (rejecting that claim 
that unpaid staff are employees under the NLRA because "[ u ]npaid staff do not receive 
compensation for their work at the station."); Town & Country E1ec. Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 
1250, 1253 (1992), aff'd, N.L.R.B. v. Town & Countly Elec., Inc., 516 U.S. 85 (1995) 
("As long as union organizers employed by or seeking work with an employer do so for 
wages in return for assigned work, they meet the standard dictionary definition of 
'employee."'). 
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petition is upheld, CAP A will head to the bargaining table with 
Northwestem and likely, eventually, other private universities with similar 
athletic programs. As mentioned, the bargaining would likely ensue over 
various benefits including comprehensive health insurance, multi-year 
scholarships, and educational trust fund, stipends, or other compensation. 
The union's successful bargaining for any of these benefits would 
indirectly affect female athletes, even if they are not part of the union, 
because Title IX requires institutions to treat men's and women's sports 
equally in the aggregate. 
1. Under Title IX, Separate Athletic Program Must Be Equal 
Title IX is a federal statute passed in 1972 that simply prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational 
institutions. 114 Title IX's application to college athletics-though initially 
contested by the NCAA 115-was confirmed by Congress in 1987 when it 
amended the law to require Title IX's application to all of a covered 
institution's programs, including programs like athletics that don't directly 
receive federal funds. 116 Though the statutory mandate is vague, Title IX's 
implementing regulations, enforced by the Department of Education, 
clarify the statute's application to various contexts, including athletics. 
Title IX's regulatmy provision goveming athletic programs is rather 
unique to civil rights law, in that it applies a separate-but-equal 
framework. 117 In contrast to most other aspects of education, athletics may 
pe1missibly be segregated by sex. 118 But, institutions must be able to 
demonstrate equality between the two programs in three general contexts: 
the number of opportunities they provide to members of each sex, the 
114. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (2014). Because of its application to educational 
institutions, Title IX would not apply to compensation or benefits athletes received 
from third parties, such as commercial sponsors. 
115. SMITH, supra note 3, at 147. 
116. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 
(1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687). This amendment to Title IX nullified Grove 
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), a Supreme Court decision holding that Title 
IX only prohibited sex discrimination within those programs that received federal 
funding, rather than institution-wide. 
117. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Kiselewich, Note, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX 
Regulations for Single-Sex Public Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. 
REv. 217, 254 (2008) ("The 'separate but equal' doctrine has flown beneath the radar 
and continued to thrive in the realm of athletics, where Title IX is perhaps best known 
for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex."). 
118. Aside from athletics, Title IX's application to prison programs and single-sex 
classes may also be said to apply a separate-but-equal framework--in contrast to Title 
IX's application to other contexts like employment and admissions. See id.; Christine 
M. Safarik, Constitutional Law- Separate but Equal: Jeldness v. Pearce -An Analysis 
of Title IX Within the Confines of Correctional Facilities, 18 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 337 
(1996). 
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overall quality of the program, and the comparability of scholarship dollars 
awarded to athletes of each sex. With regard to the first matter, the 
Department of Education's well-lmown three-part test provides a flexible 
measure of equality in the number of opportunities: an institution must 
either demonstrate athletic opportunities proportionally to the gender 
breakdown of the student body, or be able to show historical and 
continuous program expansion for women (as the "underrepresented sex"), 
or be able to show that women's interests and abilities in athletics are fully 
satisfied by whatever lopsided distribution of athletic opportunities the 
institution presently maintains. 119 
The second aspect of equality examines the quality of those athletic 
opportunities made available to men's and women's programs in the 
aggregate. According to the Title IX regulations, an institution must ensure 
"equal treatment" in te1ms of such exemplary factors as facilities and 
equipment, practice and competition schedules, access to and quality of 
coaching, academic services, medical services, and publicity, among 
others. 120 To be clear, equal treatment does not require identical overall 
aggregate spending on men's and women's sports (though disparate 
expenditures will walTant a nondiscriminatmy explanation). 121 Nor does 
equal treatment require athletic departments to offer identical benefits to 
men's and women's teams. 122 Differences that result from unique aspects 
of particular sports are, appropriately, permitted. 123 But the overall quality 
of the men's and women's programs must be equivalent. While it is 
pe1missible under these regulations to implement a tiering system under 
which some spotis receive higher-quality resources than others, tiering 
must benefit a similar number of female as male athletes. 124 Athletic-based 
119. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title 
IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979) 
[hereinafter 1979 Policy 
Interpretation]. 
120. 34 C.P.R.§ 106.41(c)(2)-(10) (2010). 
121. ld. at§ 106.41(c) ("Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex 
or unequal expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors 
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the Assistant 
Secretaty may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams for one sex in 
assessing equality of oppmiunity for members of each sex."). 
122. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71,415. 
123. Id. For example, equal treatment does not require men's and women's 
programs to receive "the same" equipment, but rather, that men's and women's needs 
with respect to equipment are met to a comparable degree. 
124. Id. at 71,422 ("[N]o subgrouping of male or female students (such as a team) 
may be used in such a way as to diminish the protection of the larger class of males and 
females in their rights to equal participation in educational benefits or opportunities. 
Use of the 'major/minor' classification does not meet this test where large participation 
spmts (e.g., football) are compared to smaller ones (e.g., women's volleyball) in such a 
manner as to have the effect of disproportionately providing benefits or opportunities to 
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financial aid is also an aspect of equal treatment, as Title IX regulations 
requires that athletic-based financial aid be distributed proportionately to 
the number of students of each sex who are participating in athletics. 125 
2. Title IX Does Not Permit Unequal Treatment Arising from 
Market-Based Sexism 
Title IX's regulations apply the concept of equality differently in the 
context of athletics than elsewhere in education. 126 For the most part, Title 
IX requires educational institutions to provide men and women with 
equality of opportunity, rather than equality of outcome. 127 For example, to 
the extent that Title IX applies to college admissions, or to employment, 
the law is satisfied when no one is turned away because of a sex-based 
exclusion or quota. 128 As long as men and women have an equal 
opportunity to compete for a spot in the entering class, or for a job on the 
faculty, a college or university is largely free 129 to apply neutral criteria-
interest and ability, for example-even m ways that produce 
dispropottionate outcomes. 
If athletics worked the same way, then access to athletic opportunities 
could be similarly based purely on merit and interest. Title IX would be 
satisfied by allowing women to try out for the football team, regardless of 
whether any woman tried or succeeded to make the team. Pragmatically, 
however, the regulations' drafters recognized that such a standard would 
never produce more than hypothetical equality, since women's historical 
exclusion from athletics has suppressed their interests and abilities relative 
to men's. 130 And courts, for their own part, have rejected arguments that 
the members of one sex."). 
125. 34 C.F.R. l06.37(c) (2004). 
126. See, e.g., Kelley v. Bd. ofTrs., 35 F.3d 265,270 (7th Cir. 1994) (recognizing 
Title IX's unique application to athletics, resulting from Congress's recognition that 
"athletics presented a unique set of problems not raised in areas such as employment 
and academics."). 
127. Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX's Sex-Based 
Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible?, 97 
Nw. U. L. REV. 731, 737-38 (2003) ("The drafters made clear that with respect to 
admissions, Title IX would require only formally equal treatment of women and men. 
Women and men would compete against each other on a 'level playing field,' one in 
which they were measured against the same set of criteria, for the same spots in the 
same academic programs."). 
128. Id. 
129. In some contexts, Title IX prohibits conduct that is not intentionally 
discriminatory but that produces a disparate impact on the basis of sex. See, e.g., David 
S. Cohen, Title IX Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 217, 276-78 
(2005) (discussing Title IX's incorporation of a disparate impact standard). 
130. As Professor Brake explains, Title IX's application to athletics rejects a 
"liberal" feminist approach that would require equality for female athletes only so far 
as they are similarly situated to their male counterparts in terms of interest and ability. 
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male students' relatively higher interest in athletic participations justifies a 
disproportionate distribution of opportunities in their favor. 131 
Instead, the regulations require that an athletic program's participation 
outcomes are equalized-preserving opportunities and resources for female 
athletes without conditioning them on a demonstration of interest and 
ability. In this way, Title IX allows women to overcome the historical and 
contempormy social forces that, unmitigated, would continue to constrain 
their oppmtunities. 
Consistent with this reasoning, judicial and regulatmy interpretations of 
Title IX' s equal treatment mandate foreclose an institution from defending 
a disparity on grounds tracing back to third-party or market-based sexism. 
For one example, high school boys' teams often have active and generous 
booster clubs that donate resources and amenities. 132 These donations may, 
and frequently do, produce an unequal outcome wherein some male 
athletes have access to higher quality equipment, a better facility, or other 
perks that no female athletes have access to. OCR has clearly stated that 
schools cannot use the fact that they relied on donated funds as a defense 
for unequal treatment. 133 In a 1995 opinion letter, OCR explained that 
"private funds ... , although neutral in principle, are likely to be subject to 
the same historical patterns that Title IX was enacted to address."134 The 
equal treatment mandate "could be routinely undermined" if third-party 
sexism provided a defense.l35 
Deborah L. Brake, Title IX As Pragmatic Feminism, 55 CLEV. Sr. L. REv. 513, 537 
(2007). Instead, Title IX's separate-but-equal approach incorporates a. "substantive 
equality/accommodation model" that, like affirmative action, "justifties] gender-
conscious treatment as a way of ensuring meaningful athletic opportunities for 
women." !d. 
131. Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 767-69 (9th Cir. 
1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 174 (1st Cir. 1996); Kelley v. Bd. ofTrs., 
35 F.3d 265, 270 (7th Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 
1993); Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (lOth Cir. 1993). In 
rejecting the relative interest theory, these courts necessarily read Title IX's three-part 
test as going beyond a formal equality approach that would require equal treatment 
only so long as women and men are similarly situated in terms of interest and ability. 
Deborah Brake, The Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and the Themy Behind Title IX, 
34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 13, 56 (2001). 
132. See Erin E. Buzuvis & Kristine E. Newhall, Equality Beyond the Three-Part 
Test: Exploring and Explaining the Invisibility of Title IX's Equal Treatment 
Requirement, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 427, 442 (2012). 
133. ld. 
134. Letter from John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, Office for 
Civil Rights, to Karen Gilyard, Esq., Atkinson, Andelson, Loya, Ruud & Romo (Feb. 
7, 1995), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/jurupa.html; see 
also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, TITLE IX INVESTIGATORS MANUAL 5 (1990). 
135. Letter from John E. Palomino to Karen Gilyard, supra note 134; see also 
Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., Fla., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (M.D. Fla. 1997) 
("The Defendant suggests that it cannot be held responsible if the fund-raising activities 
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It is equally clear that a sport's ability (or potential) to generate revenue 
does not justify unequal treatment. 136 As one federal court has succinctly 
noted, "Title IX requires that revenues from all sources be used to provide 
equitable treatment and benefits to both girls and boys. A source of revenue 
may not justify the unequal treatment of female athletes."137 Title IX's 
legislative history further helps clarify this point. In 1974, Senator John 
Tower proposed an amendment that would have exempted revenue-
producing intercollegiate sports from Title IX' s coverage. 138 Congress's 
rejection of this and subsequent similar amendments 139 sends a clear 
message that the law authorizes no special treatment based on revenue, a 
sentiment echoed by OCR as well. 140 
Case law also provides support for the idea that a sport's potential to 
generate revenue creates no exception to a college or university's 
obligation to provide equal treatment to its men's and women's athletics 
programs. 141 In one case, plaintiffs challenging unequal treatment of 
Temple University's women's athletics program as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause relied in part on the fact that Temple spent "$2100 more 
per male student athlete than female student athlete."142 The university 
attempted to neutralize this disparity by arguing that it was skewed by the 
inclusion of revenue-producing spmts. But the court rejected the relevance 
of this consideration. For one reason, the court was not satisfied that 
Temple's women's sports would not also produce revenue if they received 
the same investment of resources. More fundamentally, however, the comt 
understood that "it is clear that financial concerns alone cannot justify 
gender discrimination."143 In another case, the Washington State Supreme 
of one booster club are more successful than those of another. The Court rejects this 
argument. It is the Defendant's responsibility to ensure equal athletic opportunities, in 
accordance with Title IX. This funding system is one to which Defendant has 
acquiesced; Defendant is responsible for the consequences of that approach."). 
136. Brake, supra note 130, at 125-26 (noting that the sports that produce revenue 
"do so because educational institutions have chosen to invest substantial resources in 
them to make them popular"). 
137. Ollierv. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1112 (S.D. 
Cal. 2012). 
138. 120 Cong. Rec. 15,322, 15,322-15,323 (1974). 
139. For detailed legislative histmy on this issue, see Christina Johnson, Note, The 
Evolution of Title IX: Prospects for Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 GOLDEN 
GATE U. L. REV. 759, 764-66 (1981). 
140. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71,419 ("[A]n institution of 
higher education must comply with the prohibition against sex discrimination imposed 
by that title and its implementing regulations in the administration of any revenue 
producing intercollegiate athletic activity.") (quoting April 18, 1979, Opinion of 
General Counsel, Department ofHealth Education and Welfare, page 1). 
141. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
142. Id. at 527-28. 
143. Id. at 530. 
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Court rejected the University of Washington's argument that "[b)ecause 
football is operated for profit under business principles, [it] should not be 
included in determining whether sex equity exists."144 Though the court 
went on to affirm an injunction that allowed each sport to "reap the benefit 
of revenue it generates," it emphasized that this allowance did not change 
the university's overall obligation to "achieve sex equity under the Equal 
Rights Act." 145 To be sure, the comis in these two cases were applying 
federal and state equal protection mandates rather than Title IX. The 
relative lack of litigation on this point under Title IX only reflects that the 
statute's treatment of this issue is even more clearly settled. 
3. Benefits Obtained Through Collective Bargaining Are Subject 
to Equal Treatment 
Consistent with these fundamental principles of equality reflected in 
Title IX, including the idea that sexism in the marketplace does not absolve 
universities of discrimination based on sex, courts and regulators properly 
ought to continue to interpret the statute to prohibit college and university 
athletic departments from providing a higher-quality athletic experience to 
athletes of one sex-even if the favorable treatment that creates that 
disparity arises from a collective bargaining process. 146 Imagine, for 
example, that Northwestern decided to provide comprehensive health 
insurance to athletes on the football team. Now imagine that the university 
decides to limit this benefit only to athletes on the football team, on the 
grounds that football generates the most revenue, or on the grounds that 
football has an active booster club that has raised and donated money for 
this purpose. There is nothing in Title IX that prohibits the university from 
extending that benefit to those players for those reasons. But, applying the 
analysis above, 147 the law clearly requires the university to provide a 
commensurate number of female athletes with the equivalent benefit, even 
144. Blair v. Wash. State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Wash. 1987). 
145. Id. at 1384. 
146. Some may object on fairness grounds to a result in which female athletes 
would benefit from compensation they have not essentially earned by offering 
marketable labor or names, images, and likenesses. To address this discomfort, I first 
point out that the O'Bannon tmst fund itself, before considering its application to 
female athletes, already allows free-riders, by requiring payments "in equal shares" to 
the athletes on a team-including those who did less or nothing to contribute to the 
overall demand for the right to broadcast the team's games. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. 
Supp. 3d 955, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2014). As for collective bargaining, that too-generally 
speaking, has been known to benefit free-riders such as public sector employees who 
exercise their rights under right-to-work laws to opt out of union membership. See, e.g., 
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (enjoining the enforcement of a provision of 
state law that would have required home health care workers to pay dues to a public 
sector union as a means of detening free riders). 
147. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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though the reasons for extending it to the football players do not apply to 
them. Now change the university's reason for providing its football players 
with comprehensive health insurance to one rooted in collective bargaining. 
The Title IX outcome does not change; there is nothing in the statute that 
prohibits the university from extending that benefit to those players for that 
reason. But it must still comply with equal treatment by extending that 
benefit to a proportionate number of women. 
Comprehensive health insurance is arguably the most straightforward 
example to illustrate the role that Title IX, properly construed, should have 
on benefits that are obtained by athletes through collective bargaining. 
This is because the "laundry list" of factors the Title IX regulations provide 
as the basis for measuring equal treatment of men's and women's athletics 
programs expressly includes "provision of medical services"148-a factor 
that has been interpreted to include "health, accident, and injmy insurance 
coverage."149 Other items that could potentially be on the bargaining table 
include multi-year scholarships, stipends, tlust fund payments, or other 
manners of financial compensation, things that are not expressly mentioned 
in the equal treatment regulation. Yet, it is still proper to conclude that 
Title IX would require a college or university to offer these benefits to 
female athletes as well. For one reason, the regulations make clear that the 
laundry list is not exhaustive; it is preceded with language stating that equal 
treatment is measured by consideration of these "among other factors" 150 
and. OCR has elsewhere considered non-laundry list items such as 
recruiting and administrative support to be components of equal 
treatment. 151 
For another reason, the concept of equal treatment in the aggregate also 
underscores the regulation pertaining to athletic financial aid. 152 This 
regulation would apply to any bargained-for compensation that is tied to 
educational expenses, such as increased scholarship amounts or cost-of-
attendance stipends. Because the regulation requires an allocation of 





34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(8) (2010). 
1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71 ,417. 
34. C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2010); 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 
151. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71,417. 
152. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (2004). 
153. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71,415 ("The Department will 
examine compliance with this provision of the regulation primarily by means of a 
financial comparison to determine whether proportionately equal amounts of financial 
assistance (scholarship aid) are available to men's and women's athletic programs. The 
Department will measure compliance with this standard by dividing the amounts of aid 
available for the members of each sex by the numbers of male or female participants in 
the athletic program and comparing the results."). 
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college or university would have to provide a proportionate match for 
women any increase in dollars that it allocates to male athletes. 154 Other 
ways in which athletes may bargain to be compensated could be constmed 
to fall outside the scope of the financial aid regulation, which by its terms 
addresses grants and other non-grant assistance such as loan assistance or 
work-study that is aimed at defi·aying educational costs. However, such 
compensatory payments would properly be governed by the more general 
principle of equal treatment codified elsewhere in the regulations. Whether 
a college or university was induced by collective bargaining to provide 
seasonal stipends to union athletes, or even to buy them all cars, those 
benefits become characteristics of the athlete experience no different in 
kind from access to academic tutoring, special housing or meal privileges, 
laundry service, or any other perk that universities already provide their 
athletes and which already must be available to male and female athletes on 
equal terms. 
4. College Athletes with "Employee" Status Are Not Outside the 
Scope of Title IX's Regulations Pertaining to Athletics 
One final issue to consider in determining the Title IX implications for 
benefits obtained through collective bargaining is the extent to which Title 
IX applies to college athletes who have been deemed "employees" under 
the NLRA. Given that part of the NLRB' s reasoning in reaching that 
conclusion was distinguishing the college football players in Nmihwestem 
from students to whom the label employee did not apply, it may be 
tempting to assume that being considered an employee for labor law 
purposes forecloses treating that individual as a student for other purposes. 
Yet the fact that unionized athletes are considered employees for labor 
law purposes does not foreclose applying Title IX's regulations that apply 
to athletic opportunities and athletic financial aid. Regulators apply a 
functional test to detetmining the opportunities to which Title IX's athletics 
regulations apply. Specifically, the test considers whether the participant is 
"receiving the institutionally-sponsored support normally provided to 
athletes competing at the institution involved, e.g., coaching, equipment, 
medical and training room services, on a regular basis during a sport's 
season" and who practices or competes with the team and is listed on the 
roster as an eligible member of the squad. 155 As long as these factors 
154. Multi-year scholarships raise a different consideration as the decision to 
award multi-year scholarships does not itself change the total scholarship dollars that a 
college or university is making available to its athletes of either sex. However, the fact 
of having a multi-year scholarship (and with it, the security of automatic renewal) is 
properly considered a component of equal treatment that, separate from consideration 
of the dollar amounts, should benefit female athletic opportunities proportionally. 
155. 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71,415. Alternatively, if injury 
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continue to describe those students who may also, by virtue of the NLRB 's 
determination, be considered employees under the NLRA, there is no 
justification for excluding their athletic opportunities from a Title IX 
analysis. And while it may seem unusual that Title IX and the NLRA 
would simultaneously apply to the same enterprise given the respective 
statutes' distinct and different scope and purpose, considering the hybrid 
nature of big time college athletic programs helps to clarify that this is 
indeed the correct result. The educational aspect of college athletic 
programs-the fact that they are mn by educational institutions and purport 
to have an educational purpose and mission (not to mention the benefit of 
education's tax-exempt status)-justifies application of Title IX and its 
regulations that subordinate the institution's business objectives to higher 
priorities like equality and nondiscrimination. The commercial aspect of 
college athletic programs-the fact that they are utilizing the labor of 
others in pursuit profits-justifies applying labor law principles that apply 
to any other private business. 
This "both/and" mentality (i.e., that college athletes may be both 
employees for purposes of labor law and still partake in athletic 
oppmiunities under Title IX) means that it is not enough to apply 
traditional employment discrimination principles regarding equal pay to the 
compensation college athletes may obtain through collective bargaining-
as tempting as that may be for colleges and universities who would rather 
not provide compensation to female athletes in nonrevenue spmis. Some 
have argued that courts and regulators are sometimes permissive of 
revenue-based justifications for higher compensation for coaches of men's 
teams than women's, and argued that this standard would justify excluding 
female athletes from a compensation that male athletes obtained through 
collective bargaining. One commentator in particular156 pointed to Stanley 
v. University of Southern California, 157 in which the Ninth Circuit Couti of 
Appeals concluded that a female women's basketball coach who was paid 
less than the male men' s-team counterpmi failed to make a prima facie case 
of pay discrimination because the men's team's capacity for revenue made 
the jobs sufficiently dissimilar to warrant comparable pay. Yet, this case 
should not be read to support the conclusion that male players' capacity 
justifies paying them to the exclusion of female counterparts. For one 
reason, the proper reading of Stanley is a narrow one. The EEOC has issued 
guidance that suggests revenue-generation does not justify compensation 
disparities between male and female coaches unless "the woman is[] given 
prevents an athlete from meeting these requirements but that individual nevertheless 
receives athletic financial aid, the athlete's opportunity will count for Title IX purposes 
as well. Id. 
156. Edelman, supra note 5. Edelman, supra note 43, at 1051. 
157. 178 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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the equivalent support to enable her to raise revenue"158 a condition that 
likely only applies to few women's teams. More impmiantly, however, 
Stanley is a case about coaches, whose tenns and conditions of 
employment are outside the scope of Title IX' s equal treatment regulations 
governing the athletic oppmiunities available to students.l59 Since coaches' 
rights are provided for elsewhere in Title IX and not under the "separate 
but equal" framework that applies to athletic programs, it is not proper to 
analogize coaches' compensation to that of athletes. 
C. Title IX's Application to the O'Bannon Remedies 
Having examined the Title IX implications for benefits obtained through 
collective bargaining, the outcome at stake in Northwestern, this Pati will 
now turn to the 0 'Bannon remedies to address what particular Title IX 
related considerations would apply. If the district court decision survives 
appeal, the NCAA will have to loosen its restrictions on athletes' partaking 
in revenue generated by the use of their names, images, and likenesses by 
allowing its members to use licensing revenue to increase athletic financial 
aid to cover the tme cost of attendance and to fund a trust from which to 
make payments to athletics upon graduation. 160 Because the 0 'Bannon 
plaintiffs included Division I FBS football players and Division I men's 
basketball players, 161 the validity of NCAA restrictions on compensation of 
other athletes, including female athletes, is outside the scope of her opinion 
and apparently not addressed by the injunction issued in the case. Title IX, 
however, would apply to any payments made to athletes under 0 'Bannon, 
for the same reasons that the statute applies to compensation obtained 
through collective bargaining. As explained above, if colleges and 
universities are paying to enhance the athlete experience in some way, the 
source of funding for that enhancement does not matter. It is already the 
case that colleges and universities use licensing revenue from men's 
158. U.S EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY CoMM'N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 
ON SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE COMPENSATION OF SPORTS COACHES IN EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (1997), available at http://eeoc.gov/policy/ 
docs/coaches.html. 
159. To be clear, Title IX regulations do include access to coaching and quality of 
coaching as factors on the laundry list. But OCR and comis are clear that aspect of 
Title IX protects students' rights to receive equal treatment in this regard and does not 
protect coaches against discrimination. Title IX (along with Title VII and the Equal Pay 
Act) does protect coaches against sex discrimination, but the unique separate-but-equal 
framework that Title IX uses for athletic opportunities does not apply to employment 
(see discussion above). 
160. See supra Part I.C.2. 
161. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Class Certification, In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL 5979327, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013). 
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basketball and football to fund various aspects of their athletic programs. 162 
Just as Title IX does not permit them now to use the fact that men's sports 
generates more of that revenue as a justification for more favorable 
treatment for those programs relative to women's programs, they may not 
use that argument in the future to limit hust payments or cost-of-attendance 
stipends only to members of one sex. 163 
Relatedly, as explained above, the fact that comis' and regulators' 
interpretations of the Equal Pay Act consider revenue generation as a factor 
"other than sex" that can (in limited circumstances) justify pay disparities 
among coaches does not supersede Title IX's requirement that institutions 
provide equal treatment in the aggregate to athletes in men's and women's 
programs. 164 Yet even if it was appropriate to construe revenue generation 
as a sex-neutral factor, revenue-generation is not the criteria institutions 
will use to determine who is eligible for payments from an 0 'Bannon hl.lSt. 
Under the terms of the court's injunction, the NCAA may not prohibit 
institutions from offering ttust fund payments "in equal shares" to all 
members of the team. 165 An institution cannot withhold or reduce payment 
from those members of the team who contributed less or not at all to the 
team's marketability. Eligibility for hust payments is not detennined by 
revenue generation; it is determined by pmiicipation on a team. 166 As such, 
trust fund payments should be equalized by sex just as other benefits that 
are bestowed by virtue ofparticipation on a team are equalized under Title 
IX. 
Additionally, the fact that a hust mechanism could be used to essentially 
hold athletes' payments in escrow until graduation arguably should not 
change the Title IX analysis either. While they may. be former athletes 
when they receive the payment, they are eligible for it by virtue of having 
patiicipated in college athletics. The vested interest in future payment167 
162. NCAA REVENUES/EXPENSES DIVISION I REPORT, supra note 39, at 30. 
Division I FBS institutions generate a median of $10.4 million in revenue from 
distributions from their conferences and the NCAA. These distributions are, in tum, 
funded with revenue from contracts with broadcasters. See Chris Smith, The Most 
Valuable Cm({erences in College Sports 2014, FORBES (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www. forbes. com/ sites/ chrissmith/20 14/04/15/the-most-valuable-conferences-in-
college-sports-2014/; see also Revenue, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/ 
finances/revenue (last visited Mar. 13, 2015). 
163. See supra Part II.B.2. See also Jason Chung, The NCAA and the Student-
Athlete Trust Fund: Is Compromise Possible? (Apr. 26, 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318909 (concluding that Title IX 
applies to O'Bannon tmst fund payments). 
164. See supra Part II.B.4. 
165. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
166. Id. 
167. See Michael McCann, What Ed 0 'Bannon's Antitrust Victory over the NCAA 
Means Going Forward, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 9, 2014), 
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becomes an aspect of participation in college athletics, which as such must 
be equalized between the programs for each sex.168 Nor can institutions 
avoid their Title IX compliance obligations by allowing tlusts to be 
administered at the conference level, rather than creating their own. While 
it is arguable that a conference may not itself have an obligation to comply 
with Title IX, 169 a conference-administered tlust would be funded with 
payments or diverted revenue fi·om the college or university and earmarked 
specifically for application to the tmst. 170 Payments from the tlust are thus 
the equivalent of institutional payments, to which Title IX would apply. 171 
In light of the conclusion that Title IX applies to 0 'Bannon remedies, 
the NCAA would have to amend its bylaws to permit institutions to offer 
some manner of commensurate compensation to female athletes; otherwise, 
NCAA members would face a dilemma of compliance with NCAA bylaws 
or Title IX. 172 While it clear that such a bylaw change would have to 
pennit member institutions to comply with Title IX, there is arguable 
flexibility in the form such compliance could take. One justifiable 
approach would be to pe1mit member institutions to match the aggregate 
increased spending attributable to 0 'Bannon with a dollar amount to 
compensate female athletes that is proportionate to the percentage of the 
institution's athletes who are female. This proportionality approach finds 
its support in the Title IX regulations governing athletic scholarships and 
grants-in-aid, 173 arguably the closest analogs to stipends and tlust fund 
payments that are expressly mentioned in the Title IX regulations. The 
regulations require that institutions distribute athletic scholarship dollars in 
aggregate propmiion to the percentage of athletes of each sex. 174 To 
illustrate how this measure of equality would apply to the 0 'Bannon 
http://www .si .com/ college-basketball/20 14/08/09/ ed-obannon-ncaa -claudia-wilken-
appeal-name-image-likeness-rights (recognizing the possibility of Title IX's 
application to trust fund payments by analogizing them to defened compensation). 
168. See supra Part II.B .3. 
169. Cj NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (holding that the NCAA does not 
have an obligation to comply with Title IX simply by virtue of receiving dues from 
federally-funded institutions). 
170. See id. at 468 (distinguishing the payment of dues fi·om payments that are 
earmarked for a particular purpose). 
171. See supra Part li.B.3. 
172. O'Bannon operates to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing its bylaws to the 
extent they prohibit cost-of-attendance stipends and trust fund payments to male 
basketball and football players. So it is not necessary for the NCAA to revise its bylaws 
to allow members to make such payments. However, the injunction does not prohibit 
the NCAA from enforcing its bylaws to the extent they prohibit payments to any other 
athletes. The NCAA would therefore have to relax its restrictions on athlete 
compensation as they pertain to female athletes, in order to let institutions satisfy their 
obligations under Title IX. 
173. 34 C.P.R. § 106.37(c) (2004). 
174. !d. 
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remedies, imagine an institution where 52% of the athletes are male and 
48% are female. Then imagine that, pursuant to O'Bannon, the institution 
makes 150 $10,000 payments175-a total of$1,500,000- in a given year to 
football and men's basketball players. Borrowing the scholarship 
regulations' propotiionality approach, the institution would be obligated to 
make an additional $1,384,615 available to female players, since that is the 
dollar amount relative to $1,500,000 that is proportionate to 48%. The per-
player distribution of that amount would be up to the institution, subject to 
whatever limits the NCAA retains on the dollar value per scholarship and 
the number of scholarships per team. Altematively, the NCAA would 
arguably be justified from a Title IX standpoint if it permitted colleges and 
universities to match stipends and trust fund payments "one-for-one." This 
approach finds support in the regulation's requirement that institutions 
provide equal treatment to men's and women's programs in the 
aggregate. 176 Tmst fund payments and cost of living stipends are just 
another way in which football and men's basketball are "tiered."177 
Viewed this way, the same benefits should be made available to some 
combination of women's teams whose combined roster totals would be 
comparable to the combined number of men's basketball and football 
players. 
Ill. TITLE IX IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLEGE ATHLETIC REFORM 
Northwestern and 0 'Bannon raise the cost of mnning athletic 
depmiments that are educational and commercial in nature. Not only by 
mandating the compensation of athletes whose labor is valuable, but 
because of the simultaneous application of Title IX, the compensation of 
other athletes as well. The NCAA worries that the cost of compensating 
athletes will destroy college spotis. 178 To the extent that this is tme, it is 
even more so when we factor in the added cost of Title IX compliance. 179 
The result is that it may be too costly for college athletic departments to 
175. One-hundred and fifty is the institution's combined football and men's 
basketball roster, and $10,000 reflects the total of a $5,000 payment to the tmst plus a 
$5000 stipend to reflect the tmst cost of attendance that is not already covered by grant-
in-aid. See, e.g., Michael A. Lindenberger, Texas Athletic Director: With New Rules, 
Longhoms Would Pay Each Player $10,000, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 21, 2014, 
http: I lwww. dallasnews. com/ spmis/ college-sports/headlines/20 141 021-texas-athletic-
director-with-new-rules-longhorns-will-pay-each-player-1 0000. ece. 
176. See supra Part II.B.l. 
177. See 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71,422. 
178. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 43, at 1054 (noting and criticizing the NCAA's 
argument that athlete compensation would "destroy college sports"). 
179. See SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 145 (suggesting that Title IX 
responsibilities associated with commercial model could push schools in the direction 
of educational reform). 
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operate as they presently do. This reality, however, should not be an 
argument that compliance obligations should not apply. Rather, it should 
be harnessed as leverage for meaningful reform of college athletics. 
To this end, I argue in this Part that the costly compliance burdens 
college and university athletic departments are facing result as much from 
the choices they have made about the nature of the programs they run as 
they do from the external application oflaw. In particular, college athletics 
has cultivated for itself a hybrid status that seeks to capitalize on the 
benefits of being both educational and commercial in nature. 180 
Northwestern and 0 'Bannon force college athletics to internalize more of 
the cost of its commercial endeavors by ensuring that it, like any other 
business, adheres to the rules of the marketplace. If college athletics does 
not wish to add those compliance obligations onto its existing regulatory 
burden, which includes Title IX, it has the choice to reform itself into a 
purely educational model, one to which the reasoning of Northwestern and 
0 'Bannon would no longer apply. Alternatively, college athletics could 
choose to accept the cost of pursuing commercial interests and reduce its 
compliance burden by abandoning its relationship with higher education. 
Both of these options for reform are discussed more fully in this Part. 
A. Purely Educational Athletics Programs 
College athletics' affiliation with higher education comes with both 
benefits and costs. Benefits include exemption from tax on generated 
income, 181 ability to issue bonds and take on low-interest debt for capital 
projects, 182 institutional subsidies, 183 and goodwill of the public, students, 
and alumni. Costs, in turn, include compliance with laws like Title IX, 
which constrain college athletic department from making the kind of free-
market choices that businesses would othe1wise make. Title IX, like other 
civil rights laws, represents a democratic consensus that constraints on 
capitalism are justified by a higher priority on equality in such fundamental 
180. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND 
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 6 (Princeton University Press 1999) (arguing 
that big-time college athletic departments have it both ways by aligning with education 
for tax purposes and using business rationale but objecting to Title IX on business 
grounds). 
181. Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCmmick, The Emperor's New 
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA's Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 502 
(2008) (also pointing out that colleges and universities are not required to pay 
Unrelated Business Income Tax on revenue generated by their athletic departments). 
182. STEPHEN E. WEYL & RONALD F. RODGERS, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS: 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 1-2 (2006), 
available at 
http://www.higheredcompliance.org/resources/resources/TaxExemptBonds.pdf. 
183. NCAAREVENUESIEXPENSESDIVISIONlREPORT,supra note 39, at 30, tbl. 3.7. 
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contexts as education. 184 Accordingly, Title IX prevents college athletic 
departments from using commercial objectives as the sole basis for 
allocating resources, and instead requires equal treatment to women's 
sports even though they have less potential to generate revenue. 185 
For a college athletic department that wishes to retain its association 
with higher education, compliance with Title IX is mandatory. Compliance 
with labor and antitrust law, on the other hand, is not. A project of reform 
that distances college athletics from commercial objectives and practices 
would necessarily render inapplicable both Northwestern's requirement 
that athletic departments collectively bargain with athletes and O'Bannon's 
antitrust scrutiny over the NCAA's amateurism rules. One essential aspect 
of such reform is the revival of the Sanity Code's ban on athletic 
scholarships, 186 in favor of a system like that of the Ivy League and 
Division III, in which financial aid is awarded based on need rather than 
athletic participation. 187 This change would undermine the Regional 
Director's rationale in Northwestern for concluding that some athletes 
qualify as employees based on the presence of compensation and control. 188 
As discussed earlier, the Director found that the athletic scholarship was 
tantamount to compensation, while the fact that it was conditioned on the 
athletes' continued participation suggested control. 189 But if college 
athletic departments replaced athletic scholarships with need-based 
support, they would no longer be engaging compensation or control, 
because an athlete could discontinue participation on the team and still be 
eligible for financial aid. Such reform would also signal that the 
institution's priority is the student's education rather than his participation 
in athletics. In this way, it addresses concern that cqllege athletes are 
exploited, since it would restore an athlete's choice to participate in 
athletics without concern for economic consequences. 190 
A second aspect of education-based reform is to drastically reduce the 
184. E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REv. 1205, 1213 (2014) (acknowledging the 
conflict between civil rights and private choice); Andrew Altman, Civil Rights, in THE 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3.2 (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., Summer 
2013 ), available at http:/ /plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum20 13/entries/civil-rights/. 
185. See supra Part II.B.2. 
186. See supra Part I.B. 
187. See GRANT, supra note 12, at 456; see also JOHN GERDY, AIR BALL, 
AMERICAN EDUCATION'S FAILED EXPERIMENT WITH ELITE ATHLETICS (2006); Brian L. 
Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX As Catalyst for an Altemative Model of 
College Sports, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 351, 403-04 (1998) 
188. See supra Part I.C.l. 
189. Id. 
190. See Buzuvis, supra note 49, at 119 ("To eliminate exploitation and promote 
right-sized college athletics programs, it is also necessary to eliminate athletic 
scholarships."). 
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time commitment required for participation in college athletics. In addition 
to neutralizing the Director's arguments about the presence of employer-
like control, 191 such reform would satisfy concerns about athlete 
exploitation by ensuring that participation in athletics does not obstmct 
pursuit of meaningful education. Time commitment restraints would 
provide athletes with the freedom to select majors and courses with less 
concern for conflicts with practice schedules and travel obligations. 
Reform that restores the priority of academics in this manner would also 
have the effect of subordinating a college athletic department's commercial 
objectives. Right-sized expectations about revenue will reduce the pressure 
to engage in the very spending arms race that made the NCAA's restraints 
on player compensation harder to defend in 0 'Bannon. 192 Moreover, 
replacing athletic scholarships with need-based financial aid and reducing 
the maximum time commitment for athletics would operate "to integrate 
student-athletes into academic communities of their schools,"193 and would 
thus help the NCAA defend its amateurism mles. As various antitmst 
cases against the NCAA have made clear, the NCAA is more vulnerable to 
antitrust liability when it coordinates members' commercial operations than 
when it is engaging in non-commercial functions. 194 For this reason as 
191. See supra Part I.C.l. 
192. O'Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1002 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (rejecting the 
NCAA's argument that restraining athlete compensation is necessary to promote 
competitive balance among teams, in part because it is already the case that colleges 
and universities spend exorbitantly on athletic programs). Moreover, the court relied 
on the increased commercialization of college athletics to distinguish the facts in 
0 'Bannon from the facts that gave rise to an earlier court's finding that competitive 
balance could justify amateurism restrictions. Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Okla., 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1296, 1309-10 (W.D. Okla. 1982)). 
193. Id. at 1004. See also id. at 1003 (noting that the goal of athlete integration is 
promoted by, among other things, access to financial aid and restrictions on requiring 
athletes to practice more than a certain number of hours each week). 
194. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). In 
Board of Regents, the Court invalidated the NCAA's plan to regulate its member 
institutions' television broadcasts as an unreasonable restraint on trade. Yet, the Court 
emphasized the nanowness of its decision by including language that suggested other 
aspects of the NCAA roles not affected by its decision, including the association's 
"critical role in ... maintain[ing] [the] revered tradition of amateurism in college 
sports." Id. at 120. Relying on this distinction in Board of Regents, some lower courts 
have rejected antitrust challenges to those efforts of the NCAA, like setting rules of 
eligibility, that are "not related to the NCAA's commercial or business activities." 
Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 525 U.S. 
459 (1999); see also Pocono Invitational Spmis Camp v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 
584 (B.D. Pa. 2004). This distinction suggests that the less conm1ercial college 
athletics, the less vulnerable the NCAA is to antitrust liability. Moreover, even in those 
courts that have refused to carve out special treatment for the NCAA's non-commercial 
activities have done so on grounds of today's reality that "big time" college programs 
are infused with commercial values. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 340 (7th Cir. 
2012) ("No knowledgeable observer could earnestly asseri that big-time college 
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well, education-based reform would operate not only to insulate NCAA 
members from an obligation to engage in collective bargaining with 
athletes, but from antitrust liability as well. 
An education-based refonn would eliminate arguments that athletes are 
exploited, foreclose an institution's obligation to engage in collective 
bargaining, and reduce antitrust scrutiny on the NCAA's amateurism rules. 
In addition, such reform would have the benefit of improving Title IX 
compliance. Without the pressure to generate revenue, athletic depatiments 
would have more freedom to distribute resources across a wider atTay of 
programs, including both women's sports and non-revenue men's spotis. 195 
While an education model of college sports would likely force some 
programs to sacrifice revenue, this is not necessarily a threat to women's 
sports because many revenue-generating programs do not turn a profit that 
can be used to support other programs. 196 Moreover, it is also the case that 
programs in an educational model should be less expensive to run. In 
addition to no longer having to pay athletic scholarships, restrictions on 
athletes' time commitment would drive institutions to replace expensive, 
long-distance competition with a less expensive, regional schedule of 
competition. Athletic opportunities that are compatible with education are 
also arguably more deserving of institutional subsidies. If refotm efforts 
transfmm college athletics into providing genuine extracunicular activities, 
impmting educational values in a manner consistent with the institution's 
football programs competing for highly sought-after high school football players do not 
anticipate economic gain from a successful recruiting program."); O'Bannon, 7 F. 
Supp. 3d at 999-1000 (relying on plaintiff's "ample evidence" showing "that the 
college sports industly has changed substantially in the thirty years since Board of 
Regents was decided" in rejecting that the Comi's favorable language about the 
NCAA's amateurism policy should apply today); see also Gabe Feldman, A Modest 
Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REv. 249,254-55 (2014) (arguing 
that the amateurism "myth" that courts have relied on in upholding the NCAA's 
eligibility rules in antitrust cases "ignores the fact that the NCAA has become a profit-
seeking enterprise that governs multi-billion dollar entertainment products."). Such 
rationale further suggests that if the commercialism of college athletics was minimized 
through reform, the NCAA would have an easier time justifying its actions under 
antitrust law. 
195. SACK & STAUROWSKY, supra note 14, at 130 (noting that Title IX compliance 
costs money that universities can't afford to spend if they are busy sinking costs into 
pursuit of the commercialized model of college spmi); Buzuvis, supra note 49, at 111 
("Commercialism in college athletics threatens women's sports with permanent 
second-tier status because it authorizes universities to invest in teams in a manner 
proportionate to their attractiveness to spectators and fans-a measure that is stacked 
against women's sports-instead of in a manner designed to maximize the educational 
value of sports to student-athletes themselves, the ostensible mission of college 
athletics."); Porto, supra note 187, at 405. 
196. 54 out of 123 Division I football programs in the Football Bowl Subdivision 
do not generate net revenue. NCAA REVENUES & EXPENSES DIVISION I REPORT, supra 
note 39, at 27, tbl. 3.6. 
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overall mission, it should not need to rely on external revenue to justify its 
value to the college or university. For these reasons, the reform 
contemplated in this section is one that should unite refmmers concerned 
about athlete exploitation, advocates for women's spmis and non-revenue 
men's sports, as well as athletic departments that oppose Northwestern and 
0 'Bannon out of concern for the high cost of compliance. 
B. Purely Commercial Athletics Programs 
In contrast to a strategy of education-based refmm, college athletic 
departments can altematively reduce their compliance burdens by 
jettisoning their affiliation with higher education.197 In this model of 
refmm, colleges and universities would spin off their commercialized 
athletic departments into separate corporate entities that lack formal 
affiliation with the school. These new commercial entities-let's call them 
College Athletics Inc.-would forego existing institutional and 
governmental support for higher education and embrace the obligations of 
labor and antitrust law (as well as other laws that govern commercial 
enterprises like workers compensation, fair labor standards, and business 
income tax). 198 But in turn, College Athletics Inc. would no longer be 
197. CHARLES CLOTFELTER, BIG-TIME SPORTS IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES 215 
(2011) (attributing this idea originally to former University of Michigan president 
James Duderstadt); GRANT, supra note 12, at 456; SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 
14, at 142; see also Frank Deford, Let's Separate the Schoolin 'ji'Ofn the Sports, NPR 
(June 26, 20 13), http://www.npr.org/20 13/06/26/19550171 0/lets-separate-the-schoolin-
fi·om-the-sports ("We in the U.S. think, nostalgically, of athletics as integral to higher 
education, but perhaps they're so unusual that they should be entirely separated from 
the academic and simply turned into an honest commercial adjunct."); Peter Morici, 
Stop the NCAA insanity: Separate University Athletics ji'Ofn Academic Requirements, 
Fox NEWS (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2014/03/31/stop-ncaa-
insanity-separate-university-athletics-from-academic-requirements/ ("The solution may 
be to permit the top 30 or 40 major universities to form football and basketball teams 
'affiliated' with their institutions and a major pro-franchise, but require those be self-
financing based on ticket sales, TV revenues and contributions from their professional 
team."). 
198. Because of the commensurate cost, such an approach would only be attractive 
to institutions in the top-earning conferences of Division I's FBS. GRANT, supra note 
12, at 458. The recent reorganization of the NCAA's "Power Five"-the Big 10, the 
Big 12, the Pacific-12, the Southeastern Conference, and the Atlantic Coast 
Conference-could potentially provide limit to the scope of such a proposal. Because 
the Power Five conferences, with 65 members among them, generate the most revenue 
from broadcasts and ticket sales, they have both the incentive and the means to attract 
talented athletes by offering market-based compensation. Perhaps they are already 
taking a step in this direction, as the Power Five are reportedly already planning to 
consider proposals that would allow members to offer athletes stipends up to the cost of 
attendance. Dan Wolken, NCAA Board Approves Division I Autonomy Proposal, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/07/ncaa 
-board-of-directors-autonomy-vote-power-five-conferences/13 716349/. 
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subject to Title IX's requirement to support women's sports, since the 
law's scope only extends to programs run by federally funded educational 
institutions. 199 By divorcing college athletes from higher education, the 
commercialized athletic enterprises would be free to devote resources in 
any manner they wish in the pursuit of maximizing profits, including 
compensating employees on whatever terms the market would bear. 
Of course, these employees would no longer be students200 but 
professional athletes in the paradigm of a minor league.201 Those that do 
not continue their careers into the NFL or the NBA could elect to pursue 
college education once their engagement with College Athletics Inc. is 
over.202 They could even potentially bargain for future tuition payments as 
a form of defened compensation.203 In this way, a move to purely 
commercial college athletic programs would eliminate concerns about 
athlete exploitation. College athletics could no longer pretend that 
199. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1687 (2014). In order for an enterprise like College 
Athletics, Inc. to fall outside of Title IX, it would have to be legally as well as 
functionally separate from its former university. If the university continues to provide 
funding and exert control over the incorporated athletic department, the athletic 
department would still appear to be an "operation" of a "college [or] university ... any 
part of which is extended federal funding assistance" and thus subject to Title IX. Id. at 
§ 1687; Williams v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 477 F.3d 1282, 1294 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
If outside the scope of Title IX, College Athletics, Inc. would not have to provide 
commensurate resources to women's athletics program, since that "separate but equal" 
model of equality is unique to Title IX and justified when athletic opportunities are 
being provided in an educational setting. As an employer, College Athletic, Inc. would 
be prohibited by Title VII from discriminating on the basis of sex in its hiring decisions 
and in the terms and conditions of employment. As this applies to the hiring of 
athletes, however, Title VII would only require the employer to avoid using sex as a 
reason not to hire an otherwise qualified female athlete for the position. It would not 
require the enterprise to offer separate programs for women or hire female athletes who 
do not meet the physical requirements of the position. See, e.g., Lanning v. 
Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002) (upholding employer's 
requirement for physical fitness that had a disparate impact on female applicants); see 
also Syda Kosofsky, Toward Gender Equality in Professional Sports, Note, 4 
HASTINGS WOMEN's L.J. 209, 236 (1993) ("Since professional sports are a form of paid 
employment, theoretically, the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act should be useful 
in rectifying the discrimination that professional women athletes experience in the form 
of denial of opportunity and unequal pay .... However, both the Acts themselves and 
their judicial interpretation are inherently limited by the underlying theories of gender 
differences."). 
200. If athletes receive "institutionally-sponsored support normally provided to 
athletes competing at the institution," then Title IX would apply. See supra Part II.B.4 
(citing 1979 Policy Interpretation, supra note 119, at 71,415). 
201. GRANT, supra note 12, at 456. 
202. Cf Morici, supra note 197 ("Pay the athletes, offer them the opportunity to 
earn a degree over five or even six years, but don't require them to enroll if they are not 
capable or are simply disinclined."). 
203. SACK & STAUROWKSY, supra note 14, at 142. 
,j, 
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"student-athletes" are students and use the semblance of an education as an 
excuse not to pay them. Athletes could make clear choices about whether 
to pursue playing career or an education, or even to fully engage in the 
former and then the latter. 
While such an approach would not increase women's athletic 
opportunities within College Athletics, Inc., this version of athletics reform 
would have the benefit of sequestering the problem of gender inequality 
outside the realm of education where it is particularly powerful and 
offensive.204 Meanwhile, the institution itself could continue to provide a 
more diverse array of lower-cost athletic opportunities for men and women 
consistent with the educational model discussed above. In fact, the 
institution could generate revenue necessary to fund those opportunities by 
leasing its facilities and licensing its trademark name and mascots, etc. to 
the incorporated athletic department. 205 In this way, the reform described 
in this section could potentially produce a net increase in the number of 
college athletic opportunities as well as gender equality among those that 
remain under the auspices of higher education. 
Though limited in attractiveness to only the most profitable programs, 
within that group this proposal could potentially appeal to reformers 
opposed to athlete exploitation, advocates for women's sports and men's 
nonrevenue sports, as well as those concerned about the cost of 
compliance. 
CONCLUSION 
As a result of recent litigation, college athletics may soon be compelled 
by law to reform its long-standing policy of amateurism that prohibits 
compensation to athletes. This result, which flows from the application of 
labor and antitrust law to increasingly commercialized college athletics, 
will raise the cost of running college athletic departments, not only to 
provide the compensation to the athletes in commercialized programs, but, 
by virtue of Title IX, to female athletes in non-revenue sports as well. Yet 
rather than downplaying the role of Title IX in this regard, reformers 
should embrace its potential to help ensure that the commercial/educational 
hybrid model of college athletics is one that is too costly to sustain. By 
converting from hybrids into purer versions of either education or 
commercial, college athletics can minimize concerns about exploitation, 
promote gender equity, restore educational compatibility, and contain costs. 
For these reason, it is important that college athletics confront the Title IX 
implications of decisions that result in compensation for athletes. 
204. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 131, at 82 ("Educational institutions play a key 
role in the social processes that construct the cultural meaning of sport and its 
relationship to masculinity and femininity."). 
205. GRANT, supra note 12, at 456; CLOTFELTER, supra note 197, at 215. 
